# QUEENSLAND COAL MINING BOARD OF INQUIRY 

Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999
Board of Inquiry Notice (No 01) 2020

## RECORD OF INTERVIEW <br> Adam Kenneth Maggs

At: Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy, Leve1 5, 44 Ne 1 son Street, Mackay, QLD

On Monday, 8 June 2020 at 10.04am

Conducted by: Mr John Tolhurst, Principal Investigations Officer, Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy
Mr Steven Stook, Mining Inspector, Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy

Also present: Mr Andrew Rich, Solicitor, Slater \& Gordon Lawyers

MR TOLHURST: This is a record of interview being conducted at the office of the Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy situated at leve1 5, 44 Ne1son Street, Mackay, on Monday, 8 June 2020.

Persons present for this interview are John Tolhurst, Steven Stook, Adam Maggs and Mr Andrew Rich.

Adam, the time by my watch is 10.04am. Do you agree with that?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: For the purposes of voice identification during this interview, I'm just going to ask each person present to state their full names and their position, starting with myself. Adam, my full name is John Patrick Tolhurst. I'm a principal investigations officer with the Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy. For the purpose of the interview, I am just showing Adam my identification, but, more importantly, in that fine print on the back is my authorisation as an authorised officer under the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. Do you agree with that?

MR MAGGS: Yes, I do.
MR TOLHURST: Are you happy with that, Andrew?
MR RICH: Yes, thanks, John. Yes.
MR STOOK: My name is Steven Rudolf Stook. I'm an inspector of mines with the Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy. I have my ID card on my desk. If you would like me to provide that as evidence, I can go and get that.

MR RICH: We probably should, to do everything properly, shouldn't we?

MR STOOK: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Okay, hang on. The time is 10.05. I will just suspend the interview while you get that, Steven.

SHORT ADJOURNMENT

MR TOLHURST: The time is now 10.07am, just recommencing the interview after Inspector of Mines Stook left the room to get his identification.

During that two-minute break, Adam, do you agree that we didn't talk about this matter at all?

MR MAGGS: Correct.
MR TOLHURST: Okay, thank you. That's Inspector Stook's identification.

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR RICH: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Just your full name?
MR MAGGS: Adam Kenneth Maggs. Anglo American I work for, and I'm a longwall deputy.

MR RICH: Andrew Rich. I'm a solicitor with Slater \& Gordon Lawyers and I'm representing Mr Maggs today.

MR TOLHURST: Thank you. Adam, is there any other person in this room who has not identified themselves?

MR MAGGS: No.
MR TOLHURST: Adam, as you're aware, we're conducting an investigation in relation to an incident or a serious accident that occurred at the Grosvenor Coal Mine on 6 May 2020 whereby five coal mine workers received serious injuries at longwall 104. I intend on asking you some questions about that matter here today. Do you understand that?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: My intention is to speak to you about the matter in the form of an electronically recorded interview. By that, I mean I will be recording our conversations and any statements that you make here today by the device on the table in front of you. Do you understand that?

MR MAGGS: Yes.

MR TOLHURST: You will be later supplied with a copy of today's interview as well as a transcript. Do you understand that?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: For the purpose of clarity and later identification of who is speaking on the tape, I would ask that rather than gesture or nod your head to a question, should you wish to make a comment, that you do so by speaking clearly and not talk while someone else is talking. If there's something you wish to say, you will be given every opportunity to do so. Do you understand that?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: As an authorised officer under the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, I may require a person to attend before me to answer questions. On this occasion, you may be able to provide answers to questions to ascertain whether this Act has been complied with. Can I confirm if you received a notice requiring you to attend today?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Can I confirm how you received that notice?
MR MAGGS: Via Andrew Rich and via email.
MR TOLHURST: Thank you. Can I confirm that you understand the contents of that notice?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: And did you attend today because of that notice?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Just for the purpose of the interview, I'm just going to show Adam Maggs my copy of that notice, both sides. Is that the same notice you received?

MR MAGGS: Yes, yes.
MR TOLHURST: Thank you. Are you happy with that, Andrew?

MR RICH: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: As a result of that, Adam, I therefore formally require you to answer questions put to you regarding this matter here today. I make this requirement under the provisions of section 157 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999.

I further warn you pursuant to section 158 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 that it is an offence to fail to comply with this requirement unless you have reasonable excuse to do so. An example provided under the Act of a reasonable excuse is if complying with the requirement might tend to incriminate you or make you liable for penalty.

However, that particular excuse does not apply if the requirement relates to a serious accident, of which this is, as defined under the Act. Do you understand this requirement?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: I also warn you that under sections 179 and 180 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, it is an offence to provide false or misleading information or documents to an officer. Do you understand this requirement?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Do you need any further time to discuss these requirements with Mr Rich?

MR MAGGS: No.
MR TOLHURST: You've told me that your full name is Adam Kenneth Maggs?

MR MAGGS: Yes, correct.
MR TOLHURST: And, again, your present occupation?
MR MAGGS: Is a longwall deputy, production, Grosvenor mine, employed by Anglo American.

MR TOLHURST: Adam, have you consumed any alcohol or intoxicating substances today?

MR MAGGS: No.
MR TOLHURST: Have you taken or should you have taken any drugs or medication today?

MR MAGGS: No.
MR TOLHURST: Is there anything preventing you from ably partaking in this interview?

MR MAGGS: No.
MR TOLHURST: Mr Rich, I understand you're here as a legal representative to Mr Maggs?

MR RICH: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Throughout the interview, you will be permitted to advise your client and call brief adjournments to talk to your client in private. However, I ask that you do not answer questions addressed to your client. At the close of the interview, I will give you the opportunity to place on record any statement in relation to this matter. Do you understand this?

MR RICH: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Have you had sufficient time to discuss this matter with Mr Maggs?

MR RICH: I have.
MR TOLHURST: Are you satisfied he understands the section 157 notice?

MR RICH: I am.
MR TOLHURST: Are you satisfied he understands the provisions of sections 157, 158 and 159 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act?

MR RICH: He understands the effect of them, yes.
MR TOLHURST: And are you satisfied he understands the
provisions of sections 179 and 180 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act?

MR RICH: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Thank you. Adam, before we go into the questions, again I would just like to remind you that although you are compelled to be here today, the department fully understands the incident and the emotion that goes with that and what you may have witnessed and what you've been going through the last three to four weeks.

Again, at any time you wish to have a break, by all means ask for that break. And at any time you don't think you can continue with this interview, please let us know and we're happy to reschedule the remainder of the interview at a later time.

MR MAGGS: Thank you.
MR TOLHURST: Adam, before $I$ go into the questions, can you just provide a brief overview of your experience in the coal mining industry?

MR MAGGS: Yes. So I have 18 years' experience in coal mining. I started off in Lithgow, New South Wales. I was a contractor there for General Underground Services. We did some belt installations, secondary support, a couple of longwal 1 moves down there.

That was probably two years down in Lithgow, and then we had the chance to come up here to Queensland with the same company, General Underground Services, and do some longwall moves out at Newlands Southern. I did two out there. I was still working for GUS Mining, is what they were called, and I got a temporary development job in Oaky North, spent about eight months there in development with - as a contractor while they were going through negotiations for the union.

I then, after that, finished - I got offered a full-time job there at Oaky North and knocked it back to take up a supervisor's role with GUS at Oaky 1. I spent two years there. I was a project manager for GUS and also a supervisor in longwall secondary support, face roads and just some general outbye work.

I spent two years there and then I got a job at Carborough Downs when it opened. So I spent 10 years at Carborough Downs. My roles there were development. I went into a development panel - well, ended up being miner driver for a few years there. I went into the longwall for a little bit and shearer driver, and then I got selected to go into the deputy program there.

I went into the deputy program there, and the first six to ever do it at Carborough, went through that, spent eight months, 12 months there and got my deputy certificate, went into a deputy's role there, in bord and pillar panel there, development. I spent a little bit of time in the gateroads as well.

Then they started bringing up - or asking for ERZ leads, lead job there, which is sort of an under-manager role that they brought in there. I took on that role. I did that for 18 months and then left Carborough Downs.

I went to heavy - I forget his name - HD Mining did a longwall move at Oaky 1, and did a week with Rob Knowles at Grasstree, just as a contract area, sort of, there while I was waiting for the job process at Grosvenor to overtake.

I started at Grosvenor six years ago. I went into a bull gang job straightaway there as a deputy, spent probably six to eight months in the bull gang there, first tailgate, number one tailgate, with the ED machines and that. I then went to outbye for a little bit and then got a production job with the gateroads and the mains.

I had a development crew there for probably two years, two to three years, had a good crew, and then I was also doing relief under-manager work as well there. I went to outbye for six months. You know, outbye can be a little bit boring sometimes, and I wanted a panel, so I got the opportunity to go in the wall, and I've been in the wall for probably the last two, two and a half years.

MR TOLHURST: Thank you for that. With regards to the incident that occurred on 6 May 2020 at the Grosvenor mine, did you provide a statement?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Just for the purpose of the interview,

I have a three-page double-sided statement here, dated 6 May 2020, and the name of it's Adam Maggs. I'm just going to title this document 1 . What can you tell me about that document?

MR MAGGS: Yes, so the debrief officer was Neal Bryant. When I got out of the pit that day, I went into an office by ourselves and we did this statement or debrief. We came up - I was struggling at the time, I will be honest. You know, we went into that, but we also did a video statement. So not everything's in there, but that statement --

MR TOLHURST: No, that's fine. That is your statement?
MR MAGGS: Yes, that is, yes.
MR TOLHURST: Okay, no worries, thank you. And also in your role as a longwall deputy for production, do you prepare daily stat reports?

MR MAGGS: I do.
MR TOLHURST: For the purpose of the interview, I'm just going to show Adam four stat reports I have here, dated 6 May, 5 May, 4 May and 3 May 2020, and I'11 just labe1 these as document 2, document 3, document 4 and document 5. Each of them are two pages, and each of them have a signature of Adam Maggs on the second page. I don't need the details of the report, but can you just confirm that they are, or not, the stat reports prepared by yourself?

MR MAGGS: Yes, I can confirm.
MR TOLHURST: Okay, thanks, Adam. Are you happy with that, Andrew?

MR RICH: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: We may refer to these during the interview from our questions, but they're also here for you to be able to refer to during the interview for the purpose of refreshing your memory of the activities that occurred on or around about that date.

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Adam, can you just provide an overview of
the role and responsibilities of your position as a longwall deputy?

MR MAGGS: Yes. I'm a longwall deputy. I'm a production deputy. My roles include inspection, inspection regime. We all know what is in the inspection regime, you know, gas management, strata, and so on. Also, man management --

MR TOLHURST: Sorry, what's that?
MR MAGGS: Man management as well. I've got a crew of 12 blokes. So I've got four tradies, I've got two floaters and I've got six operators. So my roles are production, production only. We do maintenance one hour a shift, you know, or we do have a maintenance role.

MR TOLHURST: What crew do you work with?
MR MAGGS: A crew.
MR TOLHURST: How long have you been with A crew?
MR MAGGS: Probably just on two years.
MR TOLHURST: What shift were you working on 6 May?
MR MAGGS: It was afternoon shift.
MR TOLHURST: What are the hours of an afternoon shift?
MR MAGGS: So, hours of the boys are from 9.30 to 9.30. I usually get there an hour, hour and a half early.

MR TOLHURST: So, what, would you be 8.30 to 10.30 or --
MR MAGGS: No, 8.30 to probably quarter to 10 .
MR TOLHURST: What roster do you work?
MR MAGGS: Seven and 7, alternate rotation, so afternoon and nights.

MR TOLHURST: The swing that you were on on 6 May, what shift into that swing was it?

MR MAGGS: It was the last shift.

MR TOLHURST: And do you do a handover at the start and end of each shift?

MR MAGGS: It's hard to do a handover at the start with the offgoing deputy from night shift, because we don't overlap, due to the bull gang deputy. So I do a debrief with the bull gang deputy when we get down there, but I also sign and go over the stat reports and previous reports before $I$ go down of the night shift and do a debrief with the under-manager.

MR TOLHURST: With regards to you commencing your shift on 6 May, you mentioned there's no formal handover, but you do have a debrief and read the stat reports when you commence. Was there anything of any note in that process with regards to longwall 104 on 6 May?

MR MAGGS: "Note", meaning?
MR TOLHURST: Of concern or of interest.
MR MAGGS: So we were - we did have a cavity that we were managing for two days leading up to that, two or three days leading up to it, around that 144 to 149 chock. It was noted in there.

It was also noted about the 145 and 146 chocks being tipped down. It was also noted in there that, you know, we had a fault that we'd been managing also around that 112 mark. It had about a 3 metre downthrow and it was coming from maingate across to the tailgate slowly.

Also that day, we had no access over the tailgate drive. We hadn't had it for probably 24 to 48 hours leading up to that, due to - the cavity wasn't protruding into the roadway, but there was a lot of weight out on the standing support and they were mushrooming and that a bit. And, you know, it's just - we just made it clear that we weren't accessing out there at the time, due to a bit of weight around that area.

MR TOLHURST: Any questions you want to ask about that at this stage?

MR STOOK: No, no.
MR TOLHURST: Do you recall who was working with you on

6 May?
MR MAGGS: Through my shift?
MR TOLHURST: Your shift.
MR MAGGS: So my crew?
MR TOLHURST: Yes, your crew.

was, again, a floater for the week because I was missing one of my shearer drivers, Josh Sloan, so he was a person that had come in just for the week. I'd previously had him. I also had Matt Gunn, electrician. Jackson Hayes, electrician. Tommy Barry, fitter - he was also a stand-in because my other fitter was doing some jobs on the surface. And Josh Underdown.

MR TOLHURST: What position did Josh have?
MR MAGGS: He was a fitter, too, sorry.
MR TOLHURST: No-one else on your crew?
MR MAGGS: That was it for my crew, yes.
MR TOLHURST: Adam, can you step us through, I guess, your movements from when you arrived underground and what you may have undertaken up until the time of the incident?

MR MAGGS: Yes, so step by step?
MR TOLHURST: Yes.
MR MAGGS: Yes. I arrived underground most probably around 10-ish. We got to the crib room. I debriefed the boys. So, you know, we spoke about it upstairs, about the cavity management that day and that, and I just fully went back through, you know, what we were at with the 144 to 149 cavity, where the fault was on the face, the two chocks being tipped down at the time were 145 and 146 , and what the face was doing, what the gas was doing, so, you know,
reading the last reports and that.
I then went through a plan with them. So the plan was - you know, what I'd been told from upstairs was we weren't in a position to pump at the time, due to the - you know, the cavity was only in a level 2. It was only over five chocks. There was no tip to face. It was all tight. There was no need to pump. We couldn't pump while we had those tips down, anyway. Pulling up for 24 hours, you know, losing the tailgate - they were considerations. So our thought process was to go through to 149, open it up and get those 145 and 146 up in the air.

So I spoke about that. The boys were clear on that. They agreed on that. They were happy with that. They actually had no questions. I just mentioned to them again about, you know, keeping the face tight, cavity management, what we do every day with tight - if we need to double-chock, we'11 double-chock. If we need to pull up, we'11 pull up. We'11 check gases and different things like that.

I also mentioned about not being able to get over the top of the tailgate drive. I couldn't get over there at the time. I did also mention about our maintaining Venturis and butchers doors at the time.

And then we went in - I asked if there were any questions. They asked about, you know, me pack then. We get a longwall pack, so they asked if there was any toolbox talks or any - that day, I didn't receive any toolbox talks. There was nothing in the pack. There was no horizons or anything to plan or cut through. So then I said --

MR TOLHURST: Sorry, would there normally be something like that supplied in the packs?

MR MAGGS: Toolbox talks usually come in every day. There was nothing in there that day. There may have been no toolbox talks.

MR TOLHURST: Who prepares those kits or that pack?
MR MAGGS: The longwall coordinator. So there was nothing in the work pack for the operators. There is the work orders that the tradies get, so there's electrical work
orders and also mechanical work orders, and then also work orders for myself. So I handed them to the tradies, asked, "Any questions?" I actually asked Injured coal Mine Worker I, the shearer driver, if he was happy with that plan again. I sort of double-checked with him. We spent 10 minutes, 15 minutes there, and he was happy with the plan.

What I usually do then is I usually walk the belt road in. So I usually walk the belt road, and the boys usually take the Driftrunner down to the last open cut-through. So they went their merry way down in the Driftrunner, and I walked the belt road.

I walked in that way, checking the belt, doing my stat. I took a vent reading at - it was around 33 to 34. I checked wet and dry, walked down that way. The boys are always usually in front of me getting to the face, because that bull gang deputy and that's on the face then.

I get to the DCB area. I always jump up on the DCB and I put my jacket up there and check Citect. I check pressures on your face, you know, check your chocks, just different gas readings in the tailgate, specially with not being able to get out there. So I checked our gas, our maingate sensors, spent probably 10 minutes there.

I went over a bit of downtime. We've got a downtime slot there. I went over the downtime slot and had a bit of a look at that and worked out what time night shift got going on production that night and had a look where the shearer was and what they were doing. I also correlated with their bull gang electrician and fitter at the time, because I could see they were all down. They spoke about they'd just done a lump breaker shear shaft, so that's why they were down at the time.

The longwall coordinator was on the face at the time then, and so was the deputy, the bull gang deputy. They were down at the tailgate, they were around the shearer and that at the time. So I checked over that. I took some readings into my notepad and different things like that.

And then I usually get off the DCB and I'11 check my creep, my creep. I'll check my chainages. I'll pull back the maingate bag and have a look down there, walk along the face and I'11 do a face inspection, you know, fire extinguishers, the works, Venturis, the face, map the face
and that, and just do a full walk straight down.
MR STOOK: What did you see when you pulled back the maingate bag?

MR MAGGS: Yes, so that maingate roadway has been, yes, well in line with 36 cut-through then. 36 cut-through was still standing. And, you know, I'll be honest with you right now, our maingate roadway and tailgate roadway had been standing. They've stood. You could see as far as you could see with that maingate roadway.

MR STOOK: Yes.
MR MAGGS: The cairns didn't even have weight on them, really. They had a little bit around that 36 cut-through. The goaf was tight up behind one - not fully tight, but you could see it was goafed up behind the shields. It was just that roadway. (Phone rang). Sorry about that.

MR STOOK: That's been one of our, I guess, ambiguous things that we've seen in all the information so far. Just for clarification, when you say the roadway was standing, that's basically just around the cairns, but everything else is in, or was it open for the width of the roadway?

MR MAGGS: The width of the roadway as far as you could see.

MR STOOK: As far as you could see?
MR MAGGS: Yes. And, you know, that was pretty - that's pretty standard with this block.

MR STOOK: Yes, yes.
MR MAGGS: And same with the tailgate.
MR STOOK: Is it standard for other blocks?
MR MAGGS: Yes and - yes and no. The maingate, you know, it would come in halfway to your rib line, to your block to your pillar side rib line in the maingate. But tailgate, no, not necessarily. Like, you know, it would follow us. You know, if we'd cut cairns out and different things like that, it would come right up to the back of our 149 and that. And, you know, it didn't this time. A lot
of the time, the boys were, you know, sometimes taking cairns and that out, and it'd hold up.

MR STOOK: In your statement, it talks about the goaf was right up to 149; right?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR STOOK: That would just be the outbye side of the goaf, not the actual roadway itself?

MR MAGGS: Not the roadway, so the goaf, the goaf. So when we're talking about that, when I said it's tight up against the back side, the goaf was tight to behind the shields. So both roadways, you know, standing.

MR STOOK: Okay, yes.
MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR STOOK: And the 149 relative to the road, how far does it sit into the road - maybe a metre, is it, or --

MR MAGGS: It sort of - it changes with the creep, as you know.

MR STOOK: Yes.
MR MAGGS: That day, it was probably anything from around 100 to 200 mm into the roadway.

MR STOOK: Yes, okay, yes.
MR MAGGS: Yes. So, you know, that's pretty standard with your creep being good.

MR STOOK: Yes, yes.
MR MAGGS: If your creeps are good in the maingate and it was pretty standard. But that also depends on your drivage of your development, too, so - but, yes, it was only sitting 100 to 200 mm into the tailgate roadway.

MR TOLHURST: A11 good, mate?
MR STOOK: Yes, yes.

MR MAGGS: Yes. So, yes, then I went across the face. I was checking my extinguishers, rear walkway. So rear walkway that day, the most I could find in CH 4 was about 1.2 to 1.3 .

MR STOOK: That was the mid-face, yes.
MR MAGGS: That was mid-face, yes. I was finding about 0.9 around the maingate.

MR STOOK: Is that strange?
MR MAGGS: No, no, not for - not for this block.
MR STOOK: Yes, yes.
MR MAGGS: You know, we had it higher. General body that day was - I was strugging to get 0.5 across the face in general body.

The most $I$ could find in CO in the rear walkway was three parts that day, three to four parts. The face looked pretty good. We were down to 90 chock until we hit that you know, the downthrow fault. It was good. It was standing up. There was no dramas.

We had a big roll, seam roll, around that fault, which we'd been managing well. That fault was at around 110 to 112 that last day. We probably had anything from about a 2.8 to 3 metre downthrow around that area. That's probably where I was getting the highest general body, that 0.6.

MR STOOK: With that roll, was there a drivage plan that you were following, because you weren't going along with the roll - that's too steep a transition, right, so where did you decide to cut into the roll and then back out of it?

MR MAGGS: We didn't have a plan. There was a horizon plan each day, but we correlated between the top of the seam at around 90 and then around probably 115. We rolled it into that area. If we had've chased that, we would have been --

MR STOOK: I know, yes.
MR MAGGS: -- yes, into the floor and that.

MR STOOK: Into the floor, yes.
MR MAGGS: Yes, so --
MR STOOK: So on the face, then, you can see the tonstein band that's up in the roof there, through your grade, and so therefore the Goonyella Middle seam, L seam, I think the one that's just below you?

MR MAGGS: Below.
MR STOOK: That was in the face as well - yes?
MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR STOOK: See anything different about gas coming over that seam?

MR MAGGS: Did I see anything different?
MR STOOK: Yes, like, was there more gas coming through there, because that's not a targeted drainage horizon, is it?

MR MAGGS: No.
MR STOOK: So was there floor gas coming through more than usual?

MR MAGGS: Yes, more than usual - I will say that, you know, probably the week and the tour before, when we've had this fault on the face, you know, averages of goaf of general body have been up than normal average.

MR STOOK: Yes.
MR MAGGS: We run at anything from around 0.2 to 0.3 general body on the face. We were getting anything up to about 1.1 leading up to that day.

MR STOOK: Around that area?
MR MAGGS: Yes. Nothing real much higher in general body, but, yes, gas averages were up, and it was around that fault area. From - you know, from 90 back to the maingate, no, there was nothing. But, you know, your fault, we had
a little bit more coming out.
Roof conditions around that area - pretty good. We were chasing it and that. We'd had some problems a couple of days before that, where we'd pumped around that area, but it was pretty good. I walked through there. I was happy with what they'd done, night shift and the day before, in managing that. We were having no problems in that area.

Went through then, got to probably around 130. There was a heap of boys there. There was a bull gang crew.

MR TOLHURST: So who was there?
MR MAGGS: So there was Jamie Dowd. Mace Kingston, the fitter. Rowan someone - I forget his last name, sorry.

MR TOLHURST: That's all right.
MR MAGGS: Anthony - I forget - I think it's Allen. And Tarna, Tarna - sorry, on the last name. And Darryl Wilson. The three fitters were doing the lump breaker shear shaft at the time. Also, Sam Priest was there, the bull gang deputy. And Mick Burgess, Cadbury - he's the longwall coordinator. And also my operators, all my operators were there before I'd got there.

So there was a few boys around that area, and I sort of looked around and I asked the boys, I asked the fitters how the shear shaft was going, and they said they weren't far off finishing that.
 a shearer driver. I didn't have too much of a conversation with Jamie. I sort of just said to Jamie, I said, "How's it going?" I said, "What are we doing? Has anything changed?" And he said, "Look, we're persevering, we're trying to get around that 145,146 area, but we've done the lump breaker shear shaft." And I said, "Yep, righto."

And then I made my way to Sam and Mick. They were a little bit further down. You know, there was a lot of spoil around that area, around that tailgate area, just build-up. We'd been cleaning and working with that area, but, as you probably both know, it doesn't take long before you get a little bit of spoil coming over the top there and
you can go backwards quicker than you're going forward, in a way.

I talked to Mick then. I told him about - I'd spoken to the under-manager upstairs about the plan we were going to come up with and his thoughts on pumping and what we were going to do. He agreed still we weren't going to pump due to those 145 and 146 chocks being down. He said, you know, the same thing I spoke about earlier with that roadway in the tailgate. If it stood for too long, we're a chance of losing that roadway with ventilation and different things like that. And if we pumped, it's not going to help those 145 and 146 chocks. They could get a little bit more pressure on them and weight on them and come down a bit more.

So we agreed on what we were going to do there, that we were going to try and get in there, manage that cavity, get into the tailgate, come back out and get those 145 and 146 chocks up and reassess it then.

I agreed with him on that. Sam Priest - we sort of did a bit of a changeover there, a debrief. He told me he'd been down to the bank crew at 36 cut-through and the travel road and spoke to them. He does the morning inspection there, and he told me not too much has changed, what I just told you, you know. The gas was a lot lower that day. General body was anything from 0.4 to 0.5 lower. The back rear walkway was a bit lower that day.

MR STOOK: And that's normal for the amount of time that you didn't produce as well?

MR MAGGS: That's right, yes.
MR STOOK: So the base had been standing for a bit, relatively speaking?

MR MAGGS: Yes. From the days before, with the pumping, yes, yes, you're dead right. He said that we still had no access over the tailgate drive, there was still some weight there and that, and he was happy with the plan. He said to me, "Is there anything else you want us to do?", and I said, "No, no, we'11 take over from there." That's pretty common, what we do then. You know, bull gang goes for crib around then, and we take over.

So I spoke to Mick. I agreed on that. Mick Burgess stayed with us. The shear shaft was done. I then proceeded into the tailgate, the tailgate drive area. I did my usual checks there, so I looked at the cavity. Tip to face was good, and it was tight. It was high, but it was tight. 145,146 was down. Venturi was running. Venturi was earthed. Butchers doors were up. Checked the rear walkways. The most I could get in there was $0.8,0.9$ in the rear walkways.

The only thing I did find in there was the tailgate phone was a bit shitty. It wasn't working real good. It had had a fair bit of poll around them, and it had a Propsetter next to it and that. So I did mention that to my electrician, for him to have a look at that later on, when he got a chance.

I jumped up onto the drive then, checked for some layering and that around that area. Couldn't get any layering. I checked again in around behind the rear walkways. No layering. Like I said, it was down. All the butchers doors were up and that. Nothing looked too much different, but there was a lot of spoil in there, as I said.

I did poke my head out and had a look at that tailgate to see how much difference it was from the day before. As I said, the standing support had some mushrooming around it, it had some weight on it. It was bulging the block side rib a little bit, but that's nothing uncommon.

There was a Sherwood curtain there. The Sherwood curtain had been in for about a week. It had some spoil around it. It was up from about 30 metres outbye, 30 to 40 metres outbye. But where the face was, there was a fair bit of spoil up on it, and it was pulled off the roof a bit there, so it was probably pulled off anywhere from half a metre to a metre in that face area.

I noticed that. I sort of looked back down, poked my head out and looked down that rear - the tailgate roadway. It was standing. As I said, the goaf was tight.

MR STOOK: How far back do you reckon it was standing?
MR MAGGS: The roadway?

MR STOOK: Yes.
MR MAGGS: A long way. It's hard to say, Steve, I'11 be honest. It stood up for a long time.

MR STOOK: Mmm, because you can't see it now.
MR MAGGS: Mmm.
MR STOOK: Yes.
MR MAGGS: Yes. It had - from the day before, it had come in a little bit from that 149. Like, in line with that 149 to where our cairn line was, it had come in a little bit. But I think that's - actually, I know that's just spoil coming in from your goaf. The roadway wasn't in. That cavity wasn't propagating out into any of the roadway. It was good. There was hardly any weight on that around that 149 to roadway.

MR STOOK: Yes, yes.
MR MAGGS: So I was happy. I was happy with the plan that we'd come up with. I was confident in that plan that we'd come up with. I checked that 149 sensor at the time and correlated it with my detector. At that time I think I only got - I think it was about - the first one I got was about $0.4,0.4$ over 8 , or something like that, and that's fairly low for what that one was - been doing.

MR TOLHURST: How did that compare to the tailgate sensor?
MR MAGGS: To, sorry, the?
MR TOLHURST: So you said --
MR MAGGS: To my gas --
MR TOLHURST: Yes.
MR MAGGS: There's a bit of difference between the sensors and our gas detectors, you know. It's been a little bit but it was only about $0.1,0.15$ between them. And, you know, that 149 sensor was continually fluctuating. It does that in the air it's at. So, you know, there were no discrepancies there or anything like that. I was pretty happy with that.

I jumped off the tailgate drive then, just verified my mini-gas to my sensors and my tailgate drive and that there. They were all good, you know, 0.1, around that area, difference.

I then went back to Mick Burgess, the coordinator, and I spoke to him, and I totally agreed with him, I agreed with the plan that he had in place, the plan they'd come up with, and I was happy with it.

I then correlated with the boys. So I got my crew in. I said, "Look, the plan hasn't changed." I then told them what gas I'd found inbye. I told them that the gas was down a little bit, as it had been the days before. I told them - I gave them my readings. I gave them the ventilation. I told them that the Venturis and all that were on, the tailgate was good.

I actually only said to the electrician that the only thing I could find was that the phone was - it was just cutting in and out. It was switching in and out with your dial tones and that, so I said, "Could you have a look at that?" I said, "Just leave it for now. Let's get in and try and do it", and I said, "We'll have a look at that if we go down again with some downtime", because he didn't have another handset on him. So I said, "Just leave it until we go down again, but prep for that."

We all agreed with that, started morning. So we spent probably - well, stop/start. We had some belt problems outbye. We were stop/start, stop/start. The boys sort of sat around that 143, 144. The rocks just kept coming in. You know, that's what we had, it was just continually that slow process of cavity management.

MR STOOK: Were they small or --
MR MAGGS: They ranged from big, very big, to sand. We had the - you know that area where you get that --

MR ST00K: Rubbly?
MR MAGGS: Yes, rubbly, pulsating stuff, and then you'd get the big one that would come down and sit on that chock. They'd yield a little bit and that. But we stuffed around there --

MR STOOK: How was 149 load-wise? I mean, was that, relatively speaking, not as high under load as the chocks that are further outbye?

MR MAGGS: 149, when I looked at the tailgate, when I came past the DCB, we had a fair bit of pressure on 149.

MR STOOK: Did you?
MR MAGGS: Yes. So the arse end of it had some pressure there. Like I said to you, there wasn't too much weight around that roadway, the tailgate roadway. It was sitting pretty good. There was some pressure and that, but 144 to 148, we had no pressure.

MR STOOK: No pressure?
MR MAGGS: There was nothing above it, you know, that area, the tips and that. We persevered. We sat there. By that stage, Neal, the under-manager, had got down to us as well, and he sat with me all day. We correlated between each other what we were doing. It was just stop/start. It was annoying, in a way, with the belt stoppages and that, because --

MR STOOK: When you say that you felt that some of the caving was coming from high, how do you mean? Does it mean that you heard the impact was a lot noisier than normal, or did you hear material detach, a couple of seconds later contact, or --

MR MAGGS: You could hear your rubble and your rocks coming from high. And the other thing I noticed, when we say - we had no tip to face. This rock was coming straight down. If you visualise it and that, it wasn't rolling. It wasn't rolling off the front of the chocks or anything like that. It was falling straight.

MR STOOK: Yes, yes.
MR MAGGS: And you know yourself, like, you know, if usually with a cavity, it'll roll from behind us and that, but it was coming from straight, and the face stood up.

MR STOOK: Yes, yes.

MR MAGGS: So it came from there. We pursued and we spoke - me and Nealo kept --

MR STOOK: Was it unusual then?
MR MAGGS: That it was coming from high and straight down?
MR STOOK: Yes, yes.
MR MAGGS: Not necessarily, no. I'd seen it before with cavities and that. And do you know, the thing I wasn't concerned about at all was, you know, we were still in a level 2 TARP. We had no tip to face. It was only over four to five chocks. We were maintaining it. It was just we wanted to get that - but it just kept coming, the rock just kept coming.

You know, we chomped away. It would come in bounds. It would choke off and we'd sort of have to chop that big rock up and sort of get past it. We pursued with that for probably two, two and a half hours. That got to around that 12.30 mark and we did another lump breaker shaft, and we didn't seem to be going too far without that lump breaker. It was getting caught up underneath that and building up, and you were getting that - the budgie feeder, if you know what I mean, with that.

So we decided we had to change that lump breaker shaft again. So we pulled back to around that 120 mark, decided on changing that lump breaker shaft, and me and Nealo each time that belt changed, stopped, I'd be going in there and checking for gases. I'd jump up and just make sure. But when we got to that 12.30 mark and we sort of hadn't got too far, we had a bit of a talk, and I came up with a plan that we'd get some Propsetters ready for that 145 and 146. We had none left.

So I jumped up there onto the tailgate drive and I took a couple of measurements for that 145 and 146 on what we needed. I wanted them cut upstairs before they brought them down, so my plan was to get them down while we were still buggering around and just have them ready there if we needed them.

I then checked with my probe, and that, what kind of gases we had around the chain and different things like that, and we had nothing, $0.2,0.3$, you know, there was
just nothing there. I checked our 149 sensor again.
I jumped off, and by that stage the fitters were working on the shearer. I had the leccy, he was stuffing around with the phone. I jumped off the phone and I said to Nealo, I said, "You know, what's your thought" - the under-manager, I said, "What's your thoughts on - you know, we put DSI on standby. Our thought is we put 200 cubes of Carbofill up in that roof. What's it going to do? Is it going to give us a chance to have a go at it, or is a rock going to come from this height and just smash straight through it, or do we keep going?"

We both agreed on it. I said also we'll get some Propsetters down from upstairs, get them ready in that last open cut-through, and just be ready, have everything in place if we needed to. He agreed. Cadbury had left a couple of hours before that, Mick Burgess had gone upstairs.

I said to Nealo - we had no tailgate phone at that stage. They were mucking around with it. I said, "We'11 go back along to mid-face. We'11 ring Cadbury up upstairs, get him to put DSI on standby, so get him to come down and get them to come down, start setting up in 35 cut-through." That usually takes two to three hours for them to set up. That'll give us a bit more of a chance to continue persuading, like, having a go at that cavity. If we do decide down the track in three hours' time, they're ready to go, they've pushed the button and we're into it, we're pumping. We also had the rock props there, the Propsetters. They'd be ready to go if we needed them, if we got through.

So I rung Cadbury up and told him. He agreed with the plan. He said, "Good, happy with that. You know, "You ring Sam Priest" - he was in the crib room - "and get him to organise the bull gang to organise the Propsetters", that kind of stuff.

Cadbury was happy with that, got off the phone, and Nealo and myself agreed on that. So we gave ourselves - by that time, it was around 1 o'clock. We gave ourselves a couple of hours for DSI to set up and that and go from there.

We then both jumped in the back rear walkways, just had a bit of a look, checked again, stuffed around in the
back with inspections, checked for some layering and that. Couldn't find - 1.2, 1.3, you know.

MR STOOK: Yes, yes.
MR MAGGS: I went back up to that 80,90 area where that Venturi was running, made sure it was going, and had a bit of a visual look around that fault, and nothing was nothing had changed or anything like that.

So I went back down to the tailgate, pulled the boys in, so pulled my crew in, so there was - at that time, there was - everyone was down there. The fitters were working on the lump breaker shear shaft. They were just about finished. And the leccies were stuffing around with the phone - one of the leccies, Gunny, and the rest of --

MR STOOK: When you say "fitters", that was Mace as well? Was he --

MR MAGGS: No, no, Mace wasn't there. No, it was just my - Tommy Barry and also Josh Underdown.

MR STOOK: Yes, yes.
MR MAGGS: The other boys were - the operators were actually throwing rocks, so they were just filling in a bit of time, just throwing some piles around that tailgate area, around 146 area. They were throwing some spoil over into the chain.

I pulled them all in, told them that the plan we had you know, they were going well. I said, "What me and Nealo have correlated upstairs is we've put DSI on standby. We're getting them down into the last open cut-through just to set up, if we need to, in the next couple of hours." I said, "That'll give us a couple more hours to go in."

I spoke to the boys about the job they were doing and that and what gas I had still, you know, the gas was down. I also had some rock props coming down. I actually asked Injured Coal Mine Workers 2\&5 to go to the last open cut-through to collect some standpipes.

MR STOOK: Just to get ready?
MR MAGGS: Just to get ready, yes, just so they were on
the face. The quicker thing for us to do is for my boys you know, if we pulled up, my boys to put the standpipes up while DSI got their pumps and that ready.

I always do that. My boys - I think they're more competent and quicker in putting them up and that. So I got them to bring them back down the face. We probably had about eight of the boys, when we were ready to go again, standing around down that area and that, and I actually said to Nealo, I said, "You know, we're on top of each other a little bit here at the moment. I'm going to send the boys to crib and up to hosing." I just said, "Whoever's - out of [njured Coal Mine Workers 1, 4\&3 and that, stay down here", and I said, "The rest of us", I said, "just sort of - we're on top of each other, and Beau."

The boys left. There was only four of us down there, and things went to plan after that. Mnneweorer went straight in. It was - lump breaker going. We got in, into that 149, back out. Nothing was above the chocks. It had come down, and we got back and we parked it up at 120 , that 120 area, 115 area, the turn-around area where the snake was. Nealo and I just looked at each other and, you know, it was good.

The boys went in then and pushed the tailgate, got that 145 up, got that 146 up. Everything was tight. Everything was up. That was around that - about quarter past 2 to 2.30 time. We thought we had another - we had to come back in again, we thought, for our second thing second cut in, but the boys then realised that we had our reverse snake there, it was in, and I also noticed that, too.

Nealo left then. Nealo tapped the boys, and I actually slapped mine corerl on the back, and mine woer , and I said, "What they did, they were getting in", and, you know, the chocking and that was nothing unusual for my boys, I'11 be honest. They're good at their job, and I slapped them on the back and I said, "Good work, boys." I said, "We're out of there", and that, and they were confident with that.

But in talking about that, that 115 or 120 to 140 , you know, it had been open, because we'd been in that tailgate for so long with that snake area. So in our terms, it was starting to unzip a little bit. That beam that we've got from our cut height, our roof cut height, to our roof
height was starting to unstitch a little bit and just deteriorate a little bit.

MR STOOK: What is that usually, about 0.8 of a metre, is it, that curl beam?

MR MAGGS: Yes, it's about 0.8, 0.7. You know, that's what we had. But it had just been left open for too long. That's the way it was. We'd been in there for too long, and it was starting to deteriorate, but it wasn't up to top of the coal seam yet. It was just flaking and that.

I said to the boys, "We'11 come back in, we'11 have a nibble at that", and I said, "and then come back out and we'11 double-chock that 120 to 140 ", I said, "just to close it up", and I said, "and then we'11 go to the maingate and we'11 go from there."

That's where - you know, we got to that around 2.30 mark. I then said to the boys they'11 then crib change in. So, you know, I've never usually got five down around that shearer at that time. I know this is unfortunate to say, but, you know, 10 minutes a day these five boys are there changing over that shearer, and this is when the incident happened.

But we spoke about that, and we spoke, you know, "Double-Chock this area. We'11 go back to the maingate, and that's where it is." That tailgate phone still wasn't fixed. He needed a new handset, and Gunny said he'd bring that back down after crib.

I said to Beau - myself and Beau Lacy, I said, "We'11 go to the maingate. I'11 ring Cadbury upstairs, Mick Burgess upstairs, and, you know, that's - I'll let him know that we've got through, we've got them chocks up, the face looks tight, we're through it, we're going to do an extra shear, and we'11 reassess it when we get back." That was everything up to the incident.

MR TOLHURST: So where did you make that call from?
MR MAGGS: The call to Cadbury?
MR TOLHURST: Yes.
MR MAGGS: I then made my way to the maingate from that

> 120 while the boys started to double-chock, so the on1y ones left down the face then were the five boys, so Injured Coal Mine Workers $5,4,1,3 \& 2$.

We walked to the maingate. The boys - we actually did a lump breaker shaft again in that time, right at the end there, when we got around that 148, 149, but I made that decision to wait until we got to the maingate. And we had to do FI checks and, you know, our hour of power. I said, "Wait until we close this face up, get back to that maingate and we'll do the whole lot then." So I actually stopped Mace, Tommy Barry, and I think it was a Joy fitter with them at the time.

MR TOLHURST: What was his name?
MR MAGGS: I can't think of his - sorry, I can't recall it, to be honest with you. I can't think of it. I would know it if I seen it, straightaway.

Stopped them at around 10, 12 chock and said, "Look, boys, this is what we're doing. We're coming to the maingate. I've closed it up. Just wait until we get up here until we do the lump breaker shaft and all that."

So they had a few checks and that to do there. I went to the DCB then, so the maingate DCB area then, hopped up on top there and I used the maingate phone there. I wanted to have a look at the pressures, as well, of the chocks around that area, if 149 and that had got any. I made that phone call to Cadbury. He didn't answer. As soon as I hung that phone up, that's when the first --

MR TOLHURST: Wave?
MR MAGGS: Wave, yes.
MR TOLHURST: Thanks, Adam, for up to that stage. How are you going?

MR MAGGS: Yes, I'm good.
MR TOLHURST: Do you want to have a break?
MR MAGGS: No, no, I'm good.
MR TOLHURST: Okay.

MR MAGGS: Yes.

MR TOLHURST: Just a couple of things I just want to ask you about what you've mentioned. I didn't want to interrupt you. You mentioned you were down at the tailgate, tailgate drive, and a Venturi was operating?

MR MAGGS: Mmm.

MR TOLHURST: Was there just the one Venturi?

MR MAGGS: Yes, there was just the one operating. So there were two hung there from the week before. We only had one operational all week. It was earthed. It was running all week.

MR TOLHURST: And you mentioned up around about 80 to 90 chock, there was another Venturi?

MR MAGGS: Yes.

MR TOLHURST: Was there only one?
MR MAGGS: Yes.

MR TOLHURST: That's all I had just to clarify with that.
MR ST00K: A11 the butchers flaps were basically in place as normal?

MR MAGGS: Yes.

MR STOOK: The Sherwood curtain had been squared off with the longwal1 block?

MR MAGGS: Yes.

MR STOOK: Normally you tie that in to your side shield or --

MR MAGGS: Sorry, no, it was in 1 ine with that 149 chock, and it was hanging on the cairns. So we'd braced that to the cairns and ran that right the way down to the cairns, and it was probably 30 metres down, and then we sort of had it a metre off the block brick, just so you can get that dilution rate in around that area. It was good, but, like

I said, around that - it was hanging off the roof a little bit around that area, due to spoil being through there and that shearer tapping it a little bit and pulling it off the roof there.

MR TOLHURST: Adam, you said you were obviously at the DCB, you tried to contact Mick Burgess up on top, when you felt that first pressure wave?

MR MAGGS: Mmm.
MR TOLHURST: So can you explain what you felt, what you heard at that point?

MR MAGGS: Yes. So, yes, the first one - I'd only just hung the phone up, just hung it up, and it was a pressure bump and a big pressure bump. Like, it was an event. It was a huge event. It was something I'd never felt before.

MR STOOK: You've been there for, what, two years; right?
MR MAGGS: In the wall.
MR STOOK: In the wall?
MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR STOOK: And you've been on the start of 104, start-up of 104 as well?

MR MAGGS: Yes, yes.
MR STOOK: So compared to coming away from install face and getting past the square, this event was unique?

MR MAGGS: Yes, definitely.
MR STOOK: Never felt anything like it?
MR MAGGS: Never felt anything like it, no. The thump of it and the reversing ventilation - so the ventilation reversed straightaway. I looked straight down at 1, 2, 3, 4 chock and that maingate bag, and it just billowed over the top of that, the dust and the ventilation, and that bag was just fluttering, the dust that come over the top of that area and reversed from there, it was - it was a goaf event.

I actually thought, to start with - and this is what I said to the boys on the face, "We've just lost 36 cut-through." I thought the 36 cut-through, the one we were in line with there - I thought it had come in and we'd lost that area. I thought we'd had a fall around that area, and I said that to the boys. I had my MX6 in my hand. So the face had reversed. Like I just said then, over the top of that 1, 2, 3 was just something I'd never seen, and it twists my guts now thinking about, you know, the --

MR STOOK: Yes, yes, and that's why you thought it might have been 36 , because it was closer by. It's pretty hard to imagine something happening on the face reversing the ventilation?

MR MAGGS: That's right, that's right. And just what I seen come over the top around that 1, 2, 3 chock, you know, that's what made me think that it was around that initial area and goaf area, with that maingate bag flapping so hard, it was really flapping and that. I said to the boys, I said to Johnny Badke there, Beau, and I said to Jackson, I said, "We've just lost 36 cut-through. I think that's fallen in around them."

Visibility was zero because of the reverse ventilation. I grabbed my MX6 out. I've got to be honest with you now, I thought it was quite strange, for something like that - and this is another reason I thought it was around that area, was I didn't have nothing on it. There was no gas or anything at that time. You know, it didn't it wasn't registering too much.

I then asked Beau. Beau's a trainee deputy as well. He had an ALTAIR with him as well, so I actually grabbed his ALTAIR as well, to correlate between two gas detectors, and they were pretty similar. I was getting down the DCB stairs - ladder then, at the time. So I was halfway down that ladder, it was probably 10 to 15 seconds later. As I said to you, visibility was zero. I could hardly see there. And the second one, and it was just a lot more violent, a lot bigger. We're talking six, seven times, eight times, a lot more pressure and shock.

I was getting down that DCB ladder, and it braced me, if you know what I mean. Like, the force of it braced me
up against that ladder. A couple of boys on the DCB, they hit the deck. Still again, you know, I still felt that it was a goaf - a goaf event. The force and that of around that 1, 4 and maingate area, and that maingate bag sort of fluttered. There was a bit that flapped past and that, and I still had feelings that it was definitely something around that goaf or that roadway or something like that. I still wasn't thinking of the tailgate.

But we'd lost power on that second one. The gas detectors were going off their heads. I had about 13 to 14 per cent 02, quick, but, you know, spike. CO was going off. I'11 be honest, I can't remember what - I didn't even see what it was up to. I was getting down the ladder then, and visibility was zero. I was bumping up against the rib, the DCB, trying to get down to that - peek through that maingate bag.

MR STOOK: Would you expect that amount of force, say for example, for the first one, to have been a consequence of that tailgate roadway finally coming in, for however long it was standing up for?

MR MAGGS: The tailgate?
MR STOOK: Yes. It doesn't seem like it could be.
MR MAGGS: No. I'm a long way away from that tailgate roadway.

MR STOOK: Yes.
MR MAGGS: I think it's something bigger, myself.
I really think it's a - you know, if - my initial thinkings of it now, and knowing of it, I really think we've had a huge goaf fall, you know, or that whole roadway's come in, anything from that tailgate right the way - if we've got a ring main effect or something of that.

MR STOOK: Yes, yes.
MR MAGGS: Because I poked my head through - once I got to that maingate area, that one chock and that, you know, we were right in 1 ine with that 36 cut-through, visibility was still zero. I couldn't see there, but I could see two bits of tape of the cairns that were in 36 cut-through. At that stage I knew 36 cut-through hadn't come in.

But in correlating that, at the same time, that's when I heard the boys on the DAC.


had my gas detectors, I had two gas detectors there, and I was just correlating what we had at the time. We were still in a - there was no gas there then. There was no gas at all. It had spiked and gone.

The power dropped off in that second one, and I just started running. I had a couple of boys behind me and I remember - I had a couple of boys behind me and I still had zero visibility, and I just started running for the tailgate. I was running for them boys.

I got to around that 12 area, where we had a butchers flap up there. That butchers flap was still standing there. I hit that butchers flap. I didn't see it. Hit the deck. I was trying to grab around for my second detector. Found it, and I was looking again. All good. You know, the reason for that is our rescuers. If we got into an irrespirable atmosphere and that, then the boys behind me I had to let know and that. All fine. We had bugger all.

I jumped up, got to the other side of that butchers flap, and all of a sudden it just cleared. That ventilation must have been going back the right way and it had cleared the face.
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.08/06/2020 37 ADAM KENNETH MAGGS

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.08/06/2020 38 ADAM KENNETH MAGGS


MR TOLHURST: And obviously our investigation, we're trying to - as part of our investigation, we're covering off a number of factors, electrical, mechanical as well, so I've just got some questions about maybe some things that you may have seen during the day.

MR RICH: Perhaps before you do, I was going to say, one thing that Adam wanted to talk about was about the tag board and the system they were using on their way out, which kind of follows from where we're at now.

MR TOLHURST: Sure.
MR RICH: I wonder whether or not you might want to talk about that now, before you go on with the general questions?

MR STOOK: Yes, we could go into that. Are you happy with that, before we start the questions?

MR TOLHURST: Yes, by all means, if you want to, yes.


I then went around to that single drivage. You know, when I went into that last open cut-through, it was just chaos. There was blokes everywhere. There was probably 10 to 20 blokes running around. Some had seen the boys, some hadn't. I pushed them all into a Drifty. I don't know how many I had on that last Drifty, but I threw $\begin{gathered}\text { Inured Coalivine } \\ \text { Worker } 2\end{gathered}$ helmet in the back there. They were yelling out to me, you know, "There's no-one inbye, there's no-one inbye", but I couldn't take that chance. I needed to know for myself and I had to check that tag board.

So I went and checked that tag board. I then made another phone call upstairs and said, "Look, everyone's accounted for on the face and inbye at the single drivage."

I've told Nealo and that then. They sort of wanted to go into that protocol, you know, the questions, you know, different answers. They asked me what my readings were on the gas detector and that, and I told them we had nothing at that stage. They said, "Where are you going to call from next?" I said, "The 104 tag board", so at the start of the panel.

So I jumped on the front of the Drifty. At that stage, there were some boys starting to yell and there were some things going on, and I had to stay in my zone. I had to stay in - I just said, "Look, the injured are on their way out. We're evacuating." I didn't want to go into it too much. But this is where, Andrew - this is where

I think from this 34 cut-through and the tag board systems that we run on these days, my fear from there to that tag board was, have I left anyone behind?

You know, I'm not going to know if I've left anyone behind until I get to that tag board, you know what I mean, unless we run into them. And that was just gut wrenching on that two and a half Ks out, you know, that, and not knowing if it was going to go again, another third blast, or something like that, or the pit. You know, the coal dust had picked up and that.

But, you know, it just tore me to bits, that thought of leaving someone behind. That's just my role and that. And not knowing until I got out to that tag board - when we got out to that tag board, there was probably two Driftrunners worth there, and it was just chaos. I got out of there. There was blokes pulling tags off left, right and centre of the injured and all that.

That was the only thing that was going to give me a true indication if I had left anyone inbye, and I snapped. You know, I snapped. I told everyone to, "Put the fucking tags back on the tag board, get your own tag and jump in a Drifty."

That's when I - I still had eight unaccounted for. Four of them were the injured. I was 90 to 99 per cent sure that the other four were the four that took them out, but I wasn't going to take that risk. I sent the boys out then in the two Driftys, because Chris Aires had come in in another Drifty by himself, and I sent them out and said, "Make sure" - and they didn't want to leave me, but I said, "Go." Until I got confirmation that them eight at that tag board were upstairs and out of there, I wasn't leaving there.

Airesy had three missing in the mains, and we got confirmation 10 minutes later, but just that - I think there's a real discrepancy we could probably maybe look at later on down the track in the way we use tag boards into an incident like this.

There was a tag there that was left, there was actually nine, and I yelled out to the boys, "Who's this?" They said, "That tag's been underneath in the tokens for well over a week and a half now." You know, I wasn't sure
on that. But it's just something else in that situation, you know. I haven't spoken to management about this or anything like that. I just think it's a real discrepancy here, and, I don't know, I think we could look at that area between there.

MR TOLHURST: A better system?
MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR STOOK: Yes, including personal location devices that are active all the time, as Beau suggests, on the face.

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR RICH: It seemed people were taking tags everywhere. It just happened that Maggsy was firm enough to tell them to put them back, but a different person in a different situation might not have done that.

MR TOLHURST: Lucky you were there and not following up the Driftys --

MR RICH: That's true, too.
MR TOLHURST: -- and the two Driftys had already been there and left, and you got there and those tags --

MR RICH: That's right.
MR MAGGS: Yes, you're right, yes. Different things like that, you know, even a little tag board on the face. I'11 go into a situation a week ago - a couple of weeks before that, where someone from the dark side had left their tag on the face one, on the face little tag board, but it was two days before we got there, and it was still there.

In that situation where I was coming off the face, I could have sent myself or blokes back down that face looking for that one bloke, when they hadn't been there for a couple of days. Just that whole tag board system, I just think, you know, that works and it doesn't work in some ways. I just did want to bring that up with you.

MR TOLHURST: Yes, noted. Obviously there will be a number of recommendations that come out of the investigation, and I'm happy to put that forward.

MR STOOK: I think if you escalate the importance of it, as well. Kind of like your locks, it's not something that you want to guess about. You want to be sure.

MR TOLHURST: Adam, you've already mentioned some of the ventilation arrangements not just at the tailgate end but along the face, like Venturis and Sherwood curtains and butchers flaps. Are they standard for longwalls at Grosvenor?

MR MAGGS: No. Are you asking if there's a plan or a procedure in place?

MR TOLHURST: Is there a plan or a procedure?
MR MAGGS: No, no. No.
MR STOOK: How is that implemented? I've not actually seen anything like it in longwalls before. It just seems like there's quite a lot of additional face ventilation management that you have to have in place to manage the methane on that face, and it's just 104 that it was implemented.

MR MAGGS: Yes, yes. So the exceedances around that 149 sensor, I'm going to say, myself, Nealo, Brad Meldrum and that - we've been the only proactive people to put them in place. We've arranged for them, but there's no plans.

MR TOLHURST: When you say you arranged for them, you arranged for the Venturis?

MR MAGGS: They were the actions we put into place after a couple of exceedances and that around that goaf area, for butchers doors to hold that fringe back a little bit and that goaf stream back, and put a Venturi in around there, but there was no plan or no standard.

MR TOLHURST: For you to implement that or to introduce that, who do you talk to or?

MR MAGGS: That was the under-manager and myself, yes.
MR STOOK: The VO just leaves face management up to you guys?

MR MAGGS: The VO instructed me on the Sunday to put in the 12 cut-through - the 12 shield one. That's all he's instructed. That's it, yes.

MR STOOK: And that was in response to similar things, was it? So they were trying to push methane back into the goaf fringe rather than it coming out even at 12 cut-through, at number 12?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR STOOK: Geez. Why do you think that --
MR MAGGS: Not pushing it back in. Reducing. Reducing the gas in the rear walkway. We're getting a higher flow of ventilation then.

MR STOOK: Increasing the velocity around --
MR MAGGS: Yes, around that rear walkway.
MR STOOK: Why do you think that this fringe is so marginal all the time? It almost seems like you take the butchers flap away, that's it, you've got an exceedance coming your way. It just seems as if that whole system is primed. Even just recent events, for reasons that seemed logical, they had to turn all goaf drainage off; right? But that capacity, 1400 litres a second, reported straight into the tailgate return; right? So it just seems as if there's no flexibility either way: you either have to have your shit right or there's gas on face. Do you know what I mean?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR STOOK: And is that unique for 104 , or was that the same at 103, 102?

MR MAGGS: No. So 104, we have had a lot more slowdowns, a lot more stoppages and a lot more exceedances.

MR STOOK: Yes, for the distance that you've retreated so far?

MR MAGGS: Yes, for what we've retreated so far, a lot more than 103, 102.

MR TOLHURST: And that's due to gas exceedances?
MR MAGGS: Yes, yes.
MR STOOK: And the 103, 102 and 101 ran normal bleeder systems, in that they have upcast bleeder systems?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR STOOK: And they have the intake system that you've got there now?

MR MAGGS: That's right, yes.
MR TOLHURST: Excuse some of these questions. I have minimal mining background.

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: How are gas exceedances managed on the face?
MR MAGGS: Through us. Gas exceedance - I'11 report them to - straightaway, we'11 stop mining, report to our under-manager. Our under-manager then will report to the mine manager. The mine manager then reports to you guys. In that process, we'll do anything to dilute or do whatever we can at the time to get that gas down, and then we will wait for firm instructions from you guys and actions put in place, and put them in place before we start mining again.

MR TOLHURST: If a gas exceedance - talking about the shearer, for example, and the gas sensors that are on the shearer. I believe, is it 2 per cent when the shearer shuts down?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: When the gas sensor obviously is activated, 2 per cent or more, and the shearer shuts down, how is that reported? Is it the same process or is that a different process?

MR MAGGS: No, it's a different process. So it's only reported through stat reports and through our downtime logging. The control room also will downtime that - will log that, and under-managers' reports.

MR STOOK: So do you have the ability to say to the under-manager, or whatever that escalation protocol is, to say, "We're struggling on the face. Is there anything you can do with the goaf drainage system to try and suck that goaf fringe back a bit more?"

MR MAGGS: So myself and the under-manager are in correlation with the - you know, that's one question I will ask before going underground, "What are we doing? Are we coming up to a goaf well? What's this goaf well sucking at the time?"

MR STOOK: Yes, yes.
MR MAGGS: But, no, I'm not allowed to - I don't make any calls. I think it's past - that's a little bit beyond me, in knowing what's going on with them goaf wells.

MR STOOK: Yes.
MR MAGGS: But I am making sure that I'm knowing what they're pulling; if they're pulling, are they increasing or decreasing?

MR STOOK: How far away you are from them?
MR MAGGS: Yes, and how far away we are and that, and what the one behind us is directly doing. I do ask the control room operator to let me know if it's starting to slow down or if it's just on a continual 1000 litres a second. So I'm keeping scope of that, but we can't - I'm not making decisions on whether we're starting one or pulling one up.

MR TOLHURST: When a gas sensor, whether it be at tailgate, on the shearer or up at maingate, is obviously there's an exceedance and it shuts down working, or the works, what's the process in restarting? So if 2 per cent cuts it off, when do you get things up and running again?

MR MAGGS: We've got a start-up plan and a stop plan from around this 115 into the tailgate. They've come up with some sums with where it correlates, and it makes measurements of what we can start up at or what we can go past 115 at. It adjusts itself at the time, and it just runs off the screen. So we're running off the screen. We can't sort of - we don't make that call. This gas strategy they've come up with, on the screen, it allows us to start
or not start. That's not deemed by us.
MR TOLHURST: So it's not something you can override?
MR MAGGS: I can't override that, no.
MR TOLHURST: It's built into the system?
MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: So when it gets back down to 1.8 or when it gets down to 1.6 , the system itself just allows you to?

MR MAGGS: Open it up, yes. And I will say, if it's 1.8 lately we've been letting it get to about 1.6, 1.7 before we start up, because we know it'll give us a better run in, in and out.

MR STOOK: If it charges as quickly as it does, yes.
MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: With regards to the AFC chain, what problems had there been with the AFC chain during your swing?

MR MAGGS: Yes, so the day before - it was actually the night before, two nights before, it would have been, the incident, night shift had a problem where an inspection plate had come off and had got caught in the maingate sprocket and damaged three flight bars and a bit of chain. So it was actually the - so Tuesday, we were down all shift. Boys were cutting chain, pulling that plate out of that bomb door at the maingate there and replacing flight bars and chain. We were down that whole shift.

MR TOLHURST: I'11 take you back to the day of the incident and just leading up to the incident. When the shearer had been stopped, you said the shearer was brought back to about 120, 123 chock?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Was the chain still running or it had stopped as well?

MR MAGGS: The chain was still running because we were double-chocking at the time.

MR STOOK: So it would have been running, then, after the first event?

MR MAGGS: It would have been, yes, yes, because we didn't drop power until that second one.

MR STOOK: Yes, yes.
MR TOLHURST: Are you able to comment on whether the chain was slapping around loose or tight?

MR MAGGS: No, sorry, I can't comment on that. To my view, there was nothing different with that chain. I did a chain - I looked at the chain, doing my face inspection, and I obviously looked at it while we were down in that tailgate area, and nothing was different. It wasn't slapping around or it wasn't loose or anything like that.

MR STOOK: Were there any tensioner issues? I mean, anecdotally we heard that it was on manual because the auto tensioner wasn't working properly, or --

MR MAGGS: Yes, I can't be certain on that.
MR STOOK: That's fine.
MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: That's okay.
MR STOOK: Yes. I guess from our perspective, as John mentioned before, we need to, however improbable, look at all of the ignition sources as well as the sources of gas.

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR STOOK: So that's why we're just asking these questions.

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR STOOK: With regards to the shearer, then, it was completely immobilised? The heads weren't lifted up or able to creep down, or the heads were down, or --

MR MAGGS: The heads were sort of just mid-range. Yes,
they wouldn't have been able to creep down or anything like that.

MR STOOK: And the integrity of the longwall itself - did you have any issues with any of the supports, leg issues, activation issues, anything? I mean, it was a brand-new wall, I suppose, they'd just started off. There were no problems there? I mean, we hear about these Chinese hydraulic cylinders and stuff like that. But everything was working as it should?

MR MAGGS: Yes, everything was working as it should. We had a couple of flippers that - you know, we were in a hydraul integrity TARP at the time, where we had a couple of flippers that weren't working at the time. But they were mid-face and that. We have had problems with those legs, but they were only 0-ring problems. They're changing out the 0 -rings on the run. No, not really, no, nothing I can recal1. The only thing I said was we had that 145, 146 down, but we got them up.

MR TOLHURST: I've just got a couple more questions about the AFC. You may be able to answer them, you may not be able to, but are you aware, were the AFC top deck water sprayers running at the time?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: They were. And were they all working, do you know?

MR MAGGS: Couldn't answer on all of them.
MR TOLHURST: How much water do they put on the AFC?
MR MAGGS: Can't answer, again.
MR TOLHURST: That's okay. Were the sprayers for the AFC return sprays on at the time?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Where does the water from the tailgate drive go to?

MR MAGGS: Back into the goaf. But at that time, we had so much spoil around that tailgate drive and all that, I'll
be honest, most of that water would have been in that bottom race and making its way through to where it could open up in that mid-face area.

MR TOLHURST: No, that's fine.
MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Have you ever found CH4 blowers coming from the floor?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: Are you able to provide any comment around that?

MR MAGGS: They were quite common. Not so much blowers, but we had a little bit of floor heave. 103 block - we've had a little bit around there. You get your blowers and that, but, you know, your consistent bubbling of - when you've got a little bit of water around that pan line and that, especially around the maingate area and that. But I spoke about it earlier, our general body is never high. I can't even get off scale or anything, that type of stuff, if you put it down right at that bubble, it doesn't lift any increase in general body or anything like that.

MR TOLHURST: You mentioned block 103. What about block 104?

MR MAGGS: We haven't had much floor heave. We've had bugger all floor heave. We've had a little bit around that maingate, but - there was some bubbling and that, but I wouldn't really call them blowers. I'd call it migrating out of the floor. We did have some blowers in 103 where it'd knock the sensor straight out.

MR STOOK: One of the things that we're trying to correlate here is that I think at about 3900 chainage on maingate, in development, maingate 104 development, they were doing pitting and all this kind of stuff, and there were some blowers coming in behind the miner. When you draw a straight line, if you could do that, it sort of aligns itself with the chainage that wall was at.

In the hazard plan, it shows that 700 metres further outbye, there's a methane risk zone within the longwall,
and we're just trying to understand if you had the blowers at 3900 chainage, why isn't that a methane risk zone as well; right? But from all accounts, there wasn't anything unusual on the face with regards to that, anyway.

MR MAGGS: No.
MR TOLHURST: I've just got a couple more, Adam. Are you aware of any sparking issues on the AFC pan line during block 104?

MR MAGGS: No.
MR TOLHURST: Previous pane1s?
MR MAGGS: No.
MR TOLHURST: Have you ever seen the lump breaker creating any sparks?

MR MAGGS: No.
MR TOLHURST: What about the shearer drum picks, have you ever seen any sparking issues with those?

MR MAGGS: I've seen them hit flippers a couple of times with a couple of operators, but no real sparking. It's just clipped them and knocked some picks off them, and I've only seen that a few times, too.

MR TOLHURST: I've got no further questions. Have you got anything, Steve?

MR STOOK: We're all trying to find out what's happened. Do you have any idea what may have contributed to the event, that may have caused the event? We're looking at electrics, we're looking at mechanicals, we're looking at spon com, we're looking at - we know that you've actually had a PUR campaign, as well, in consolidation, to try and identify whether or not the blend of herbs and spices was correct, just doing inventory control and stuff like that. But in your mind, is there anything that you could see --

MR MAGGS: I'm going to be honest, it's probably a little bit out of my league for the ignition part, but all I am going to say is that first initial pressure bump and that has come from behind us, and it was out of the ordinary and
big. Something has happened behind us. I'm sure of that. And I've said it before, seeing that on the maingate and all that - the boys were still 200 metres down the road, down the face. What I seen at that maingate, I know that something big has happened in behind there. I can't comment on the ignition side or anything like that, but that first initial bump was something that happened behind us, yes. That's about all I can elaborate on with that.

MR STOOK: That's fine.
MR TOLHURST: That's fine, Adam, and I'11 just follow up with one last question. Are you aware of anything else or any other information that may assist us in our investigation at this time?

MR MAGGS: No.
MR TOLHURST: Mr Rich, do you wish to place any comment on record?

MR RICH: No. Is there anything else you want to add?
MR MAGGS: No.
MR TOLHURST: Adam, has everything you told us here today been the truth?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: And do you have any complaints on how this interview has been conducted?

MR MAGGS: Not at all.
MR TOLHURST: Before I terminate the interview, even though we have not referred to them, I did lodge them during the interview - I'm just going to ask and invite you to initial and date the backs of these documents. You are not making any admissions by doing so. You are simply adopting them as the records that I referred to during the interview. Are you happy with that, Andrew?

MR RICH: Yes.
MR MAGGS: Can I just have a look at this, because I only got this page. Now, I'm just wondering what this is.

There's nothing in --
MR TOLHURST: No. I am assuming - sorry, I won't assume. I am guessing that these are - it's normally a six-page document, but they've only filled in the first two. So what happened was we made application under section 154 of our legislation for a copy of all witness statements that have been provided by coal mine workers at the Grosvenor mine. This is the document that I was provided.

MR MAGGS: Yes, I was just asking the question because that's what I thought - I only got that page myself, and I just wanted to see what else was in it. Only initial?

MR TOLHURST: And a date. It's the 8th.
MR MAGGS: 8th of the?
MR TOLHURST: 6th. Great, thanks, Adam. The time by my watch is 11.51 am . Do you agree with that?

MR MAGGS: Yes.
MR TOLHURST: I will now terminate this interview.
AT 11.51AM THE INTERVIEW CONCLUDED


## 33:37, 42:5

beyond [1] - 46:16
big [10] - 17:27, 23:39,
23:45, 25:19, 32:17,
37:14, 38:31, 52:1, 52:5
bigger [2] - 33:43, 34:33
billowed [1] - 32:43
bit [54]-8:6, 8:13, 8:30,
8:37, 11:37, 11:39,
14:27, 14:28, 15:16, 19:1, 19:43, 19:47,
20:14, 20:15, 20:23, 20:29, 20:36, 21:12, 21:13, 21:30, 21:36,
22:13, 22:14, 22:41,
22:42, 23:15, 23:46
24:7, 25:34, 26:26,
26:47, 27:7, 27:27,
28:11, 28:46, 29:1, 29:2,
32:2, 32:3, 34:5, 35:10,
36:7, 37:15, 37:23,
43:36, 46:5, 46:16,
47:30, 50:18, 50:19,
50:21, 50:32, 51:45
bits [2] - 34:45, 41:13
blast [1] - 41:9
bleeder [2] - 45:5, 45:6
blend [1] - 51:40
blew [1] - 38:31
block [10] - 15:33, 15:42,
17:13, 21:29, 31:35,
31:46, 50:18, 50:28,
50:29, 51:10
blocks [1] - 15:39
bloke [1] - 42:40
blokes [5] - 10:12, 40:21,
40:22, 41:18, 42:39
blowers [7] - 50:9, 50:17 50:19, 50:34, 50:35, 50:42, 51:1
board [14] - 39:36, 40:28, 40:30, 40:39, 41:1, 41:3, 41:6, 41:15, 41:16, 41:24, 41:35, 42:32, 42:35, 42:41
BOARD [1] - 1:9
Board [1] - 1:15
boards [1] - 41:41
body [9]-17:17, 17:19,
17:31, 18:34, 18:39,
18:44, 20:28, 50:23
50:26
bomb [1] - 47:33
bord [1] - 8:12
boring [1] - 8:37
bottom [1] - 50:2
bounds [1] - 25:18
boys [68] - 10:31, 12:42, 13:14, 14:9, 14:16, 16:1, 19:12, 19:29, 19:30
23:12, 23:32, 27:11
27:26, 27:39, 28:1, 28:2, 28:5, 28:8, 28:12, 28:17, 28:26, 28:31, 28:35, 28:38, 28:40, 29:13, 29:20, 29:23, 30:1, 30:2, 30:5, 30:22, 33:3, 33:7,

33:23, 34:1, 35:3, 35:5,
$35: 15,35: 24,35: 25$,
35:27, 35:35, 35:44,
36:6, 36:21, 36:25,
36:30, 36:31, 36:32, 36:36, 36:40, 36:41 36:42, 36:46, 37:6, 37:19, 37:33, 38:18, 38:33, 40:3, 40:12, 40:22, 40:43, 41:30, 41:45, 47:32, 52:3
braced [3] - 31:43, 33:46 33:47
Brad [1] - 43:27
brand [1] - 49:6
brand-new [1] - 49:6
break [7]-3:5, 7:13, 7:14,
30:43, 36:13, 37:47 39:19
breaker [12] - 14:34
19:23, 19:40, 25:22,
25:24, 25:28, 25:30,
27:14, 28:19, 30:6,
30:24, 51:18
brick [1] - 31:46
brief [2] - 6:22, 7:22
bring [5] - 28:7, 29:30,
36:24, 36:25, 42:43
bringing [2] - 8:16, 36:29
brought [3]-8:18, 25:41, 47:38
Bryant [1] - 9:6
bubble [1] - 50:25
bubbling [3]-37:25,
50:20, 50:33
budgie [1] - 25:25
bugger [3]-35:37, 38:13, 50:32
buggering [1] - 25:42
build [1] - 19:45
build-up [1] - 19:45
building [1] - 25:25
built [1] - 47:7
bulging [1] - 21:29
bull [11]-8:27, 8:28, 11:6,
11:7, 14:18, 14:32,
14:38, 19:12, 19:24,
20:45, 26:37
bump [4] - 32:17, 51:46, 52:7
bumping [1] - 34:15
bunched [2] - 36:44, 37:3
Burgess [6] - 19:25, 21:1
23:7, 26:17, 29:35, 32:7
burns [1] - 36:20
burnt [5] - 35:5, 36:1, 36:17, 38:18, 40:14 butchers [11] - 13:26, 21:7, 21:22, 31:29,
35:29, 35:30, 35:31, 35:39, 43:9, 43:36,
44:24
button [1] - 26:29

| C |
| :---: |
| Cadbury [8] - 19:25, |

26:16, 26:22, 26:34 26:40, 29:34, 29:43
30:31
cairn [1] - 22:14
cairns [8]-15:15, 15:24,
15:45, 16:2, 31:43,
31:44, 34:46
campaign [1] - 51:39
capacity [1] - 44:28
Carbofill [1] - 26:8
Carborough [4] - 8:2, 8:3,
8:10, 8:19
card [1] - 2:34
caught [2]-25:24, 47:29
caused [1] - 51:36
caving [1] - 24:28
cavities [1] - 25:11
cavity [12] - 11:22, 11:35,
12:43, 12:45, 13:6,
13:17, 20:18, 21:4,
22:17, 23:35, 24:43,
26:27
cent [5]-34:12, 41:28,
45:33, 45:39, 46:37
centre [1] - 41:19
certain [1] - 48:24
certificate [1] - 8:12
CH4 [2] - 17:3, 50:9
chain [13]-25:46, 27:30,
47:23, 47:24, 47:30
47:32, 47:34, 47:43
47:46, 48:10, 48:14
48:15
chainage [3] - 50:39, 50:44, 51:2
chainages [1] - 14:44
chance [6] - 7:32, 20:11,
21:16, 26:9, 26:26,
40:27
change [2] - 25:28, 29:20
changed [5] - 19:38,
20:26, 23:13, 25:31,
27:9
changeover [1] - 20:23
changes [1] - 16:24
changing [3] - 25:30
29:24, 49:17
chaos [2]-40:21, 41:17
charges [1] - 47:19
chased [1] - 17:42
chasing [1] - 19:4
check [7] - 13:20, 14:21,
14:22, 14:43, 14:44,
40:28
checked [13] - 14:5, 14:16,
14:24, 14:40, 21:7,
21:18, 21:20, 22:25
25:45, 26:1, 26:47, 27:1, 40:30
checking [3] - 14:14, 17:2, 25:32
checks [3]-21:4, 30:9, 30:26

Chinese [1] - 49:8
Chock [1] - 29:28
chock [14]-11:24, 13:19,
17:23, 23:45, 29:15
30:1, 30:21, 31:19,
31:42, 32:43, 33:19,
34:43, 47:39
chockie [2]-12:12, 12:14 chocking [2] - 28:38, 47:47
chocks [15] - 11:27, 12:45,
13:7, 14:22, 20:8, 20:13,
20:20, 24:3, 24:37,
25:14, 28:20, 29:36
30:29, 37:24, 39:5
choke [1] - 25:19
chomped [1] - 25:18
chop [1]-25:19
Chris [1]-41:31
chunk [1] - 37:16
Citect [1] - 14:21
clarification [1] - 15:23
clarify [1] - 31:27
clarity [1] - 4:7
[1] - 37:39
[5] - 12:13, 27:42,
30:3, 37:38, 38:39
[1] - 40:24
cleaning [1] - 19:45
clear [2]-11:38, 13:14
cleared [2] - 35:40, 35:42
clearly [1] - 4:11
client [3]-6:22, 6:23, 6:24
clipped [1]-51:28
close [3]-6:25, 29:15,
30:10
closed [1] - 30:23
closer [1] - 33:14
CO [2] - 17:21, 34:12
COAL [1] - 1:9
coal [7] - 3:33, 7:23, 7:25,
29:11, 37:25, 41:10,
53:8
Coal [9]-1:13, 2:23, 3:32,
4:17, 5:7, 5:10, 5:26,
6:42, 7:1
collar [2] - 37:15, 37:27
collect [1] - 27:43
com [1] - 51:38
coming [27] - 11:31,
18:17, 18:22, 18:28,
19:1, 19:47, 22:16,
23:33, 24:28, 24:34,
24:35, 24:44, 25:6,
25:15, 25:16, 27:41,
30:22, 32:33, 34:21,
37:33, 40:13, 42:38,
44:7, 44:25, 46:10, 50:9,
50:42
commence [1] - 11:14
commencing [1] - 11:12
comment [6] - 4:10, 48:10,
48:13, 50:14, 52:6,
52:19
common [2]-20:45, 50:17
company [1] - 7:33
compare [1]-22:31
compared [1] - 32:33
compelled [1] - 7:8
competent [1] - 28:6
complaints [1] - 52:31
completely [1] - 48:44
complied [1] - 4:21
comply [1] - 5:12
complying [1] - 5:14
concern [1] - 11:20
concerned [1] - 25:12
CONCLUDED [1] - 53:26
conditions [1] - 19:3
conducted $[3]-1: 34,2: 2$, 52:32
conducting $[1]-3: 30$
confident [2]-22:24,
28:41
confirm [5]-4:22, 4:27,
4:31, 9:29, 9:32
confirmation [2]-41:34, 41:39
consequence [1] - 34:20
considerations [1] - 13:10
consistent [1] - 50:20
consolidation [1] - 51:39
consumed [1]-6:1
contact [2] - 24:31, 32:7
contents [1] - 4:32
continual [1] - 46:30
continually [2]-22:44,
23:34
continue [2] - 7:15, 26:26
contract [1] - 8:23
contractor [2] - 7:27, 7:38
contributed [1] - 51:35
control [4]-40:15, 45:45, 46:28, 51:41
conversation [1] - 19:35
conversations [1] - 3:42
coordinator [4] - 13:45,
14:37, 19:26, 23:7
copy [3] - 4:1, 4:42, 53:7
corner [1] - 38:34
correct [3]-3:8, 5:41, 51:41
correlate [2] - 33:37, 50:39
correlated [6] - 14:31,
17:40, 22:26, 23:12, 24:22, 27:34
correlates [1] - 46:42
correlating [2]-35:2,
35:19
correlation [1] - 46:8
couple [23] - 7:28, 19:4,
24:30, 25:39, 26:17,
26:43, 27:36, 27:37,
31:4, 34:1, 35:5, 35:24,
35:25, 38:3, 42:33,
42:41, 43:35, 49:13,
49:14, 49:22, 51:8,
51:26, 51:27
covered [1] - 39:14
covering [1] - 39:29
creating [1] - 51:18
creep [6] - 14:44, 16:24,
16:35, 48:45, 49:1
creeps [1] - 16:39
crew [14]-8:33, 8:34,
10:11, 10:17, 10:19,
10:21, 12:7, 12:9, 12:28,
12:30, 19:12, 20:24,
23:12, 27:12
crib [6] - 12:41, 20:46,
26:36, 28:12, 29:20, 29:31
cubes [1] - 26:7
curl [1]-29:5
curtain [3]-21:32, 21:33, 31:34
curtains [1] - 43:8
cut [26]-13:33, 14:10,
15:7, 15:16, 15:45,
17:36, 20:24, 25:40,
26:15, 26:24, 27:35,
27:42, 28:31, 28:47,
33:4, 33:24, 34:44,
34:46, 34:47, 40:20,
41:1, 44:2, 44:7
cut-through [19] - 14:10,
15:7, 15:16, 20:24,
26:15, 26:24, 27:35,
27:42, 33:4, 33:24,
34:44, 34:46, 34:47,
40:20, 41:1, 44:2, 44:7
cuts [1] - 46:38
cutting [2]-23:22, 47:32
cylinders [1] - 49:9
D

DAC $[4]-35: 3,37: 28$
daily [1] - 9:19
[6] - 12:12, 28:13,
28:36, 30:3, 35:46
damaged [1] - 47:30
dark [1] - 42:34
Darryl [1] - 19:22
date [3] - 9:43, 52:39, 53:15
dated [2]-9:1, 9:24
daughters [1] - 38:35
days [8]-11:23, 19:5,
20:39, 23:15, 41:2,
42:36, 42:41
DCB [12] - 14:20, 14:43,
24:7, 30:27, 32:7, 33:38,
33:46, 34:1, 34:16, 40:7
dead [1] - 20:40
debrief [6] - 9:6, 9:8, 11:6, 11:10, 11:14, 20:23
debriefed [1] - 12:41
decide [2] - 17:36, 26:28
decided [2]-25:28, 25:29
decision [1] - 30:8
decisions [3] - 36:20,
36:23, 46:32
deck [3]-34:2, 35:32, 49:24
decreasing [1] - 46:23
deemed [1] - 47:1
defined [1] - 5:20
definitely [2]-32:36, 34:6

Department [6] - 1:26, 1:36, 1:40, 2:2, 2:19, 2:33
department [1] - 7:8
deputy [18] - 3:20, 5:45,
8:7, 8:9, 8:11, 8:27,
9:18, 10:2, 10:4, 10:5, 11:5, 11:6, 11:7, 14:18,
14:38, 19:25, 33:35
deputy's [1] - 8:12
desk [1] - 2:34
detach [1]-24:30
details [1] - 9:29
detector [3]-22:26,
35:33, 40:37
detectors [5] - 22:42,
33:37, 34:11, 35:18
deteriorate [2]-29:2,
29:10
development [9]-7:36,
7:37, 8:3, 8:4, 8:13,
8:33, 16:41, 50:40
device [1] - 3:43
devices [1] - 42:11
dial [1] - 23:23
difference [3]-21:27, 22:41, 23:5
different [18] - 13:20,
14:23, 14:41, 15:45,
18:17, 18:20, 20:12,
21:23, 25:46, 36:24,
40:36, 42:18, 42:31,
45:40, 45:43, 48:14,
48:17
dilute [1] - 45:26
dilution [1] - 31:47
directly [1] - 46:28
discrepancies [1] - 22:46
discrepancy [2] - 41:40, 42:3
discuss [2]-5:33, 6:31
distance [1] - 44:42
document [8]-9:3, 9:4,
9:26, 53:5, 53:9
documents [2] - 5:28, 52:39
done [5] - 14:34, 19:7,
19:39, 21:2, 42:19
door [1] - 47:33
doors [4]-13:26, 21:7,
21:22, 43:36
Double [1] - 29:28
double [7]-9:1, 13:19,
14:5, 29:15, 30:1, 47:47
double-checked [1] - 14:5
double-chock [4]-13:19, 29:15, 30:1
Double-Chock [1] - 29:28
double-chocking [1] 47:47
double-sided [1] - 9:1
douse [3]-36:20, 36:21,
36:24
Dowd [1] - 19:16
down [82] - 7:29, 7:31,
11:7, 11:9, 11:28, 12:46, 13:9, 14:10, 14:11,

14:16, 14:33, 14:35,
14:39, 14:45, 15:1,
17:23, 19:43, 20:8,
20:15, 20:24, 21:6,
21:21, 21:40, 21:41,
23:15, 23:26, 23:28,
23:45, 24:21, 24:36, 25:6, 25:41, 26:14,
26:23, 26:24, 26:28,
27:11, 27:13, 27:35,
27:40, 27:41, 28:7, 28:9,
28:14, 28:17, 28:21,
29:21, 29:31, 30:2, 31:6,
$31: 44,31: 45,32: 42$,
33:38, 33:39, 33:46,
34:14, 34:16, 36:23,
37:30, 38:10, 38:11, 41:41, 42:39, 45:27, 45:34, 45:39, 46:29, 46:36, 47:11, 47:12, 47:31, 47:34, 48:16, 48:45, 49:1, 49:20,
50:25, 52:3, 52:4
Downs [3]-8:2, 8:3, 8:19
downthrow [3]-11:30,
17:24, 17:30
downtime [6] - 14:27,
14:28, 23:26, 45:44,
45:45
dragging [3]-37:41,
38:28, 38:29
drainage [3] - 18:23,
44:27, 46:4
dramas [1] - 17:25
draw [1] - 50:43
Driftrunner [4]-14:10, 14:11, 39:2, $39: 3$
Driftrunners [2] - 40:13,

## 41:17

Drifty [8] - 37:1, 37:34,
40:23, 40:24, 40:42,
41:25, 41:32
Driftys [3] - 41:31, 42:22, 42:26
drivage [5] - 16:41, 17:33,
40:5, 40:19, 40:32
drive [11] - 11:34, 13:24,
20:41, 21:3, 21:18, 23:2,
23:3, 25:38, 31:7, 49:43,
49:47
driver [6]-8:5, 8:6, 12:12,
12:13, 14:4, 19:35
drivers [1] - 12:17
drop [1] - 48:6
dropped [1] - 35:23
drugs [1] - 6:7
drum [1]-51:23
dry [1] - 14:16
DSI [5] - 26:7, 26:23,
26:43, 27:34, 28:3
due [7]-11:6, 11:35,
11:39, 13:5, 20:8, 32:2, 45:1
Dump [2]-40:14, 40:16
dump [1] - 40:14
dumped [1] - 40:17
during [9]-2:15, 3:5,


35:46, 36:31, 48:3,
51:46, 52:7, 53:5
first-aid [2] - 35:17, 36:31
fitter [6] - 12:20, 12:21,
12:26, 14:32, 19:17, 30:12
fitters [5] - 19:23, 19:30, 26:2, 27:13, 27:18
five [7]-3:33, 13:7, 25:14, 29:21, 29:23, 30:2, 40:12
fixed [1] - 29:30
flaking [1] - 29:11
flame [2]-37:22, 37:24
flames [1] - 36:40
flap [5] - 35:30, 35:31, 35:40, 44:24
flapped [1] - 34:5
flapping [2]-33:21, 33:22
flaps [2]-31:29, 43:9
flexibility [1] - 44:30
flight [2]-47:30, 47:33
flippers [3]-49:13, 49:15, 51:26
floater [2] - 12:15, 12:16
floaters [1] - 10:12
floor [8]-17:47, 18:2,
18:28, 50:10, 50:18,
50:31, 50:32, 50:35
flow [1] - 44:15
fluctuating [1] - 22:44
fluttered [1] - 34:5
fluttering [1] - 32:45
follow [2]-15:45, 52:12
following [2] - 17:34, 42:21
follows [1] - 39:37
force [3]-33:47, 34:3, 34:19
forget [3]-8:21, 19:17, 19:21
forgot [2] - 37:37, 37:38
form [1]-3:41
formal [1] - 11:13
formally [1] - 5:5
forward [2]-20:1, 42:47
four [11]-7:11, 9:24, 10:12, 17:22, 25:14, 28:17, 37:19, 40:10, 41:28, 41:29
fragment [1] - 37:14
fringe [4]-43:36, 44:7, 44:22, 46:5
front [4]-3:44, 14:17, 24:37, 40:42
fucked [4]-35:4, 36:1
fucking [4]-38:2, 38:33,
40:16, 41:24
full $[6]-2: 16,2: 17,3: 17$, 5:38, 7:42, 15:1
full-time [1]-7:42
fully [3] - 7:9, 12:43, 15:17

| $\mathbf{G}$ | $45: 28$ |
| :---: | :--- |
|  | $\mathbf{H}$ |
| gang [11] -8:27, 8:28, | had've [1] - 17:42 |

11:6, 11:7, 14:18, 14:32, 14:38, 19:12, 19:24, 20:45, 26:37
gargling [1] - 38:21
gas [38] - 10:6, 12:47,
14:23, 14:24, 18:17,
18:22, 18:28, 18:45,
20:27, 22:37, 22:42,
23:3, 23:14, 27:40,
33:32, 33:37, 34:10,
35:18, 35:20, 37:25,
39:24, 40:37, 44:15,
44:31, 45:1, 45:20,
45:22, 45:27, 45:31,
45:32, 45:38, 46:34,
46:46, 48:34
gases [3]-13:20, 25:32, 25:46
gateroads [2]-8:14, 8:31
gear [4] - 35:16, 35:17,
37:30
geez [1] - 44:12
general [12]-7:46, 17:17,
17:19, 17:31, 18:34,
18:39, 18:44, 20:28,
39:23, 39:42, 50:23,
50:26
General [2]-7:27, 7:33
gesture [1] - 4:9
given [1] - 4:13
goaf [25] - 15:17, 16:4,
16:9, 16:12, 16:14,
18:33, 21:42, 22:16,
32:46, 33:21, 34:3, 34:7,
34:36, 43:35, 43:37,
44:6, 44:27, 46:4, 46:5,
46:10, 46:17, 49:46
goafed [1] - 15:18
Goonyella [1] - 18:8
Gordon [2] - 1:44, 3:23
grab [4] - 35:32, 37:8,
37:45, 38:12
grabbed [7] - 33:28,
$33: 36,37: 7,37: 9,37: 44$,
38:13, 38:33
grade [1] - 18:7
Grasstree [1] - 8:23
great [1]-53:19
Grosvenor [7] - 3:32,
5:45, 8:24, 8:26, 8:42,
43:10, 53:8
ground [2]-37:17, 37:25
guess [4]-12:32, 15:21,
43:4, 48:32
guessing [1] - 53:4
Gunn [1] - 12:19
Gunny [2]-27:16, 29:30
GUS [3] - 7:35, 7:43, 7:44
gut [1] - 41:7
guts [1]-33:10
guys [3] - 43:46, 45:25, 45:28
hair [1] - 37:6
half [6]-8:39, 10:32,
21:37, 25:21, 41:8,
41:47
halfway [2]-15:42, 33:39
hand [2] - 33:8, 37:15
handed [3] - 14:2, 38:43, 38:44
handover [3]-11:1, 11:4, 11:13
handset [2]-23:27, 29:30
hang [1] - $2: 43$
hanging [2]-31:43, 32:1
happy [19] - 2:28, 4:47,
7:16, 9:34, 13:15, 14:4,
14:6, 19:7, 20:42, 22:23,
22:47, 23:10, 26:35,
26:40, 39:9, 39:45,
42:47, 52:42
hard [5] - 11:4, 22:3,
33:14, 33:22, 35:44
hardly [2] - 22:18, 33:41
Hayes [1] - 12:19
hazard [1] - 50:46
hazards [1] - 36:30
HD [1] - 8:21
head [4]-4:9, 21:26,
21:41, 34:42
heads [4]-34:11, 48:44,
48:45, 48:47
Health [8] - 1:13, 2:23,
4:18, 5:8, 5:11, 5:26,
6:43, 7:2
heap [1]-19:12
hear [5] - 24:30, 24:33,
35:6, 38:37, 49:8
heard [5]-24:29, 32:13,
35:3, 48:21
heave [3]-50:18, 50:31, 50:32
heavy [1] - 8:21
height $[4]-26: 10,28: 47$, 29:1
held [1] - 38:34
helmet [4]-38:29, 38:30, 40:25
help [1] - 20:13
herbs [1] - 51:40
high [6] - 21:5, 24:3, 24:28, 24:34, 25:6, 50:23
higher [3]-17:17, 18:44, 44:15
highest [1] - 17:31
himself [1] - 41:32
hit [5] - 17:23, 34:2, 35:31, 51:26
hitting [1] - 37:10
hold [2] - 16:2, 43:36
holding [1] - 36:44
honest [10]-9:9, 15:8,
22:4, 28:39, 30:18,
33:28, 34:13, 35:44,
50:1, 51:44
hoodies [1] - 37:13
hopped [1] - 30:27
horizon [2] - 17:39, 18:23
horizons [1] - 13:33
hosing [1] - 28:12
hot $[3]-37: 8,37: 45,38: 33$
hour [4]-10:14, 10:32,
30:9
hours [10] - 10:29, 10:31,
11:34, 13:9, 25:21,
26:17, 26:25, 26:43,
27:36, 27:37
hours' [1] - 26:28
huge [4]-32:18, 34:36,
37:16, 38:47
hung [4]-30:32, 31:14, 32:16
hydraul [1] - 49:14
hydraulic [1] - 49:9
I

ID [1] - 2:34
idea [1] - 51:35
identification [5] - 2:14,
2:21, 3:3, 3:11, 4:8
identified [1] - 3:26
identify [1] - 51:40
ignition [4] - 36:35, 48:34,
51:45, 52:6
imagine [1]-33:15
immobilised [1]-48:44
impact [1] - 24:29
implement [1] - 43:40
implemented [2] - 43:19,
43:24
importance [1] - 43:2
importantly [1] - 2:21
improbable [1] - 48:33
inbye [5] - 23:14, 40:26,
inspector [1] - 2:33
Inspector [3]-1:39, 3:2,
3:10
install ${ }_{[1]}$ - 32:33
installations [1] - 7:28
instructed [2] - 44:1, 44:3
instructions [1] - 45:28
intake [1] - 45:10
integrity [2] - 49:4, 49:14
intend [1] - 3:34
intention [1]-3:40
interest [1] - 11:20
interrupt [1] - 31:6
INTERVIEW [2] - 1:20, 53:26
interview [23]-2:1, 2:6,
2:15, 2:20, 2:44, 3:2,
3:41, 4:2, 4:41, 6:12,
6:21, 6:25, 7:15, 7:17,
8:47, 9:23, 9:39, 9:41,
52:32, 52:36, 52:38,
52:42, 53:24
intoxicating [1] - 6:2
introduce [1] - 43:40
introducing [1] - 36:29
inventory [1] - 51:41
investigation [5]-3:31,
39:28, 39:29, 42:47,
52:15
Investigations [1] - 1:35
investigations [1]-2:18
invite [1] - 52:38
irrespirable [1] - 35:35
issues [6] - 48:20, 49:5,
49:6, 51:9, 51:24
it'd [2] - 16:2, 50:36
it'Il [2] - 24:43, 47:16
itself [5] - 16:10, 46:44,

40:32, 41:22
incident [10] - 3:31, 7:9,
8:42, 12:34, 29:24,
29:39, 41:42, 47:28,
47:37
include [1] - 10:5
including [1] - 42:11
increase [1] - 50:26
increasing [2] - 44:18, 46:22
incriminate [1] - 5:15
Indian [1] - 36:45
indication [1] - 41:22
industry [1] - 7:23
information [3]-5:27,
15:22, 52:14
initial [6] - 33:21, 34:34,
51:46, 52:7, 52:39,
53:13
injured [4]-39:6, 40:45,
41:19, 41:28
injuries [3]-3:34, 38:18, 38:32
INQUIRY [1] - 1:9
Inquiry [1]-1:15
inspection [7]-10:5,
10:6, 14:46, 20:26,
47:28, 48:15
inspections [1] - 27:1
47:12, 49:4, 50:44
J
jacket [1] - 14:21
Jackson [2] - 12:19, 33:24
Jamie [4] - 19:16, 19:34,

## 19:36

job [9]-7:36, 7:42, 8:1,
8:17, 8:24, 8:27, 8:31,
27:39, 28:39
jobs [1] - 12:21
John [5] - 1:34, 2:6, 2:17, 2:30, 48:32
Johnny [3]-33:23, 35:6,
35:9
Josh [4] - 12:17, 12:22,
12:24, 27:22
Joy [1] - 30:12
jump [3] - 14:20, 25:32, 41:25
jumped [9]-21:18, 23:2
25:38, 26:2, 26:4, 26:46,
35:39, 37:32, 40:42
June [2]-1:30, 2:4

## J

DAM KENNETH. MAGGS
$\qquad$

| $\mathbf{K}$ |
| :---: |
|  |
| keep $[7]-26: 11,36: 6$, |
| $36: 7,36: 36,36: 43$, |
| $36: 46,39: 21$ |
| Keep [2] - 36:46, 37:2 |
| keeping [2] - 13:17, 46: |
| Kenneth [3] - 1:22, 3:1 |
| 5:39 |
| kept $[6]-23: 33,25: 2$, |
| $25: 15,25: 16,38: 22$, |
| $38: 42$ |

kind [5] - 25:45, 26:38, 39:37, 43:3, 50:41
Kingston [1] - 19:16
kits [1] - 13:43
knock [1] - 50:36
knocked [2]-7:42, 51:28
knowing [5] - 34:35, 41:9, 41:15, 46:17, 46:21
Knowles [1] - 8:22
Ks [1] - 41:8
L
label [1]-9:25
Lacy [2] - 12:15, 29:33
ladder [5] - 33:39, 33:40,
33:46, 34:1, $34: 14$
last [16] - 7:11, 8:39,
10:46, 13:1, 14:10, 17:29, 19:17, 19:22, 26:14, 27:35, 27:42, 37:11, 39:6, 40:20,
40:24, 52:13
lately [1] - 47:15
Lawyers [2] - 1:44, 3:23
layering [4]-21:19, 21:20,
21:21, 27:1
lead [1]-8:17
leading [5] - 11:23, 11:24, 11:35, 18:40, 47:37
leads [1] - 8:17
league [1]-51:45
leave [5]-23:24, 23:27,
38:5, 38:6, 41:33
leaves [1] - 43:45
leaving [2]-41:14, 41:35
leccies [2] - 27:15, 27:16
leccy [1]-26:3
left $[18]-3: 2,8: 19,25: 36$,
26:16, 28:17, 28:35,
29:8, 30:2, 37:14, 38:13, 38:14, 41:3, 41:5, 41:18, 41:22, 41:44, 42:27, 42:34
$\operatorname{leg}[1]$ - 49:5
legal [1]-6:16
legislation [1] - 53:7
legs [1] - 49:17
letting [1] - 47:15
Level [1]-1:27
level $[3]-2: 3,13: 6,25: 13$
liable [1] - 5:16
lift [1] - 50:25
lifted [1] - 48:44
light [5] - 37:40, 37:41,
38:28, 38:29
line [11]-15:7, 15:42,
15:43, 22:13, 22:14,
31:42, 33:5, 34:44,
50:21, 50:43, 51:9
Lithgow [2]-7:26, 7:31
litres [2] - 44:28, 46:30
load [2] - 24:2, 24:3
load-wise [1] - 24:2
location [1] - 42:11
locks [1] - 43:3
lodge [1] - 52:37
$\log [1]-45: 46$
logging [1] - 45:45
logical [1] - 44:27
longwall [19] - 3:20, 3:34,
5:45, 7:29, 7:34, 7:45,
$8: 5,8: 22,9: 18,10: 2$,
10:4, 11:16, 13:30,
13:45, 14:37, 19:25,
31:35, 49:4, 50:47
longwalls [2] - 43:9, 43:20 look [14]-14:29, 14:30,
14:45, 21:15, 21:26,
23:23, 23:25, 26:47,
27:8, 30:29, 41:40, 42:4,
48:33, 52:46
Look [5] - 19:38, 23:13,
30:21, 40:31, 40:45
looked [13]-17:22, 19:30,
21:4, 21:22, 21:40,
21:41, 24:6, 28:23,
32:42, 36:6, 36:26,
48:15, 48:16
looking [6] - 35:33, 42:40,
51:36, 51:37, 51:38
looks [1] - 29:37
loose [2] - 48:11, 48:18
losing [2] - 13:10, 20:11
lost $[4]-33: 3,33: 6,33: 24$,
34:10
low [1] - 22:29
Iower [3]-20:27, 20:28, 20:29
lucky [1] - 42:21
Iump [12]-14:34, 19:23,
19:40, 25:22, 25:23,
25:28, 25:30, 27:14,
28:19, 30:6, 30:24,
51:18

## M

Mace [6] - 19:16, 27:18, 27:21, 30:12, 36:5, 36:43
machines [1] - 8:29
Mackay [2]-1:27, 2:4
MAGGS [207] - 2:12, 2:26,
3:8, 3:13, 3:19, 3:28,
3:38, 3:46, 4:5, 4:15,
4:25, 4:29, 4:34, 4:39,
4:45, 5:23, 5:31, 5:36,
5:41, 5:45, 6:4, 6:9,

6:14, 7:19, 7:25, 8:45, 9:6, 9:15, 9:21, 9:32, $9: 45,10: 4,10: 11,10: 19$, 10:23, 10:27, 10:31, 10:36, 10:40, 10:46, 11:4, 11:18, 11:22, 12:3, 12:7, 12:11, 12:26, 12:30, 12:36, 12:40, 13:39, 13:45, 15:6, 15:15, 15:27, 15:32, 15:37, 15:41, 16:7, 16:12, 16:19, 16:24, 16:29, 16:34, 16:39, 17:1, 17:8, 17:13, 17:17, 17:39, 17:47, 18:4, 18:11, 18:15, 18:20, 18:26, 18:31, 18:38, 18:44, 19:16, 19:21, 20:34, 20:39, 21:46, 22:3, 22:8, 22:12, 22:23, 22:33, 22:37, 22:41, 23:39, 23:44, 24:6, 24:11, 24:19, 24:33, 24:42, 25:1, 25:6, 25:10, 27:6, 27:21, 27:26, 27:47, 29:7, 29:43, 29:47, 30:17, 30:36, $30: 41,30: 45,31: 2,31: 9$, 31:13, 31:21, 31:25,
31:32, 31:37, 31:42,
32:10, 32:15, 32:22, 32:26, 32:31, 32:36, 32:40, 33:18, 34:24, 34:28, 34:33, 34:42, 35:15, 36:11, 36:16, 38:2, 39:11, 39:17, 39:21, 39:26, 40:3, 40:9, 42:9, 42:14, 42:31, 43:12, 43:17, 43:26, 43:34, 43:43, 44:1, 44:10, 44:14, 44:20, 44:34, 44:39, 44:45, 45:3, 45:8, 45:13, 45:18, 45:22, 45:36, 45:43, 46:7, 46:15, 46:21, 46:27, 46:40, 47:5, 47:9, 47:14, 47:21, 47:26, 47:41, 47:46, 48:5, 48:13, 48:24, 48:28, 48:36, 48:41, 48:47, 49:12, 49:27, 49:32, 49:36, 49:41, 49:46, 50:7, 50:12, 50:17, 50:31, 51:6, 51:12, 51:16, 51:21, 51:26, 51:44, 52:17, 52:24, 52:29, 52:34, 52:46, 53:11, 53:17, 53:22
Maggs [10]-1:22, 2:7, 3:19, 3:23, 4:42, 5:39, 6:17, 6:32, 9:2, 9:28 Maggsy [6] - 37:29, 37:42, 38:6, 38:37, 42:17 main [1] - 34:38 maingate [39]-11:31, $14: 25,14: 45,15: 4,15: 6$, 15:9, 15:11, 15:41, 15:43, 16:39, 17:9,

18:46, 29:16, 29:28, 29:34, 29:47, 30:5, 30:8,
30:11, 30:23, 30:27,
30:28, 32:43, 33:21,
34:4, 34:17, 34:43,
38:42, 39:5, 46:35,
47:29, 47:33, 50:22,
50:33, 50:40, 52:2, 52:4
mains [3]-8:31, 38:47,
41:38
maintaining [2]-13:25, 25:14
maintenance [2] - 10:14, 10:15
$\operatorname{man}[2]-10: 7,10: 11$
manage [2] - 20:18, 43:22
managed [1] - 45:20
management [10] - 10:7,
10:11, 12:43, 13:17,
23:35, 39:24, 42:2,
43:22, 43:45
manager [14]-7:44, 8:17,
8:35, 11:10, 20:5, 24:21,
26:6, 43:43, 45:24,
45:25, 46:2, 46:7
managers' [1] - 45:46
managing [4]-11:23,
11:29, 17:28, 19:8
manual [1] - 48:21
$\operatorname{map}$ [1] - 14:47
marginal [1] - 44:23
mark [5] - 11:30, 25:22,
25:29, 25:33, 29:20
mate [3]-16:44, 38:23,
38:40
material [1] - 24:30
Matt [1] - 12:19
matter [6]-3:6, 3:35, 3:41, 5:6, 6:26, 6:32
mean [11]-3:42, 24:2,
24:28, 25:26, 33:47,
41:6, 44:32, 48:20, 49:6, 49:8
meaning [1] - 11:18
means [2]-7:14, 40:1
measurements [2]-
25:39, 46:43
mechanical [2] - 14:1, 39:30
mechanicals [1] - 51:37
medication [1]-6:7
Meldrum [1] - 43:27
melted [1] - 38:31
memory [1] - 9:42
mention [2]-13:25, 21:14
mentioned [9]-11:13,
13:16, 13:23, 31:5, 31:6, 31:18, 43:6, 48:33,
50:28
merry [1] - 14:11
mess [2]-38:2, 38:3
methane [4]-43:23, 44:6, 50:47, 51:2
metre $[7]-11: 30,16: 22$,
17:30, 21:38, 29:4,
31:46
metres [8]-21:34, 21:35,

31:45, 36:18, 36:39,
37:39, 50:46, 52:3
Mick [9] - 19:25, 19:42,
20:4, 21:1, 23:7, 26:17,
29:34, 32:7
mid [6] - 17:6, 17:8, 26:22, 48:47, 49:16, 50:3
mid-face [5] - 17:6, 17:8,
26:22, 49:16, 50:3
mid-range [1] - 48:47
Middle [1] - 18:8
might $[4]-5: 15,33: 13$,
39:41, 42:19
migrating [1] - 50:34
mind [1] - 51:42
Mine [1] - 3:32
mine [7]-3:33, 5:46, 8:42,
45:25, 53:8, 53:9
miner [2]-8:4, 50:42
Mines [7]-1:26, 1:37,
1:41, 2:3, 2:19, 2:34, 3:2
mines [1] - 2:33
mini [1] - 23:3
mini-gas [1]-23:3
minimal [1] - 45:16
MINING [1] - 1:9
mining [5] - 7:23, 7:26,
45:16, 45:23, 45:29
Mining ${ }_{[11]}-1: 13,1: 39$,
2:23, 4:18, 5:7, 5:11,
5:26, 6:42, 7:1, 7:35,
8:21
minute [1]-3:5
minutes [5] - 14:5, 14:6, 14:25, 29:23, 41:39
misleading [1] - 5:27
missing [2] - 12:16, 41:38
mixed [1] - 35:10
moment [1] - 28:11
Monday [2] - 1:30, 2:4
months [6]-7:37, 8:11,
8:19, 8:28, 8:36
morning [3] - 20:25, 23:30, 36:18
most [5]-12:40, 17:3,
17:21, 21:8, 50:1
move [1] - 8:22
moved [1] - 37:23
movements [1] - 12:33
moves [2] - 7:29, 7:34
moving [6] - 36:22, 36:23,
36:37, 36:43, 36:46,
38:12
MR [460] - 2:1, 2:12, 2:14, 2:26, 2:28, 2:30, 2:32,
2:38, 2:41, 2:43, 3:1,
$3: 8,3: 10,3: 13,3: 15$,
$3: 17,3: 19,3: 22,3: 25$,
3:28, 3:30, 3:38, 3:40, 3:46, 4:1, 4:5, 4:7, 4:15, 4:17, 4:25, 4:27, 4:29, 4:31, 4:34, 4:36, 4:39, 4:41, 4:45, 4:47, 5:2,
5:4, 5:23, 5:25, 5:31,
5:33, 5:36, 5:38, 5:41,
5:43, 5:45, 6:1, 6:4, 6:6,
6:9, 6:11, 6:14, 6:16,

6:19, 6:21, 6:29, 6:31 6:34, 6:36, 6:39, 6:41, 6:45, 6:47, 7:4, 7:6, 7:19, 7:21, 7:25, 8:41, 8:45, 8:47, 9:6, 9:13, 9:15, 9:17, 9:21, 9:23 9:32, 9:34, 9:37, 9:39, 9:45, 9:47, 10:4, 10:9, 10:11, 10:17, 10:19, 10:21, 10:23, 10:25, 10:27, 10:29, 10:31 10:34, 10:36, 10:38, 10:40, 10:43, 10:46 11:1, 11:4, 11:12, 11:18, 11:20, 11:22, 11:42, 11:45, 11:47, 12:3, 12:5, 12:7, 12:9, 12:11, 12:24, 12:26, 12:28, 12:30, 12:32, 12:36, 12:38, 12:40, 13:36, 13:39, 13:43, 13:45, 15:3, 15:6, 15:13, 15:15, 15:21 15:27, 15:30, 15:32 15:35, 15:37, 15:39, 15:41, 16:4, 16:7, 16:9, 16:12, 16:17, 16:19, 16:21, 16:24, 16:27, 16:29, 16:32, 16:34 16:37, 16:39, 16:44, 16:46, 17:1, 17:6, 17:8, 17:11, 17:13, 17:15, 17:17, 17:33, 17:39, 17:45, 17:47, 18:2, 18:4, 18:6, 18:11, 18:13, 18:15, 18:17, 18:20, 18:22, 18:26, 18:28, 18:31, 18:36, 18:38, 18:42, 18:44, 19:14, 19:16, 19:19, 19:21, 20:31, 20:34, 20:36, 20:39, 21:44, 21:46, 22:1, 22:3, 22:6, 22:8, 22:10, 22:12, 22:21, 22:23, 22:31, 22:33, 22:35, 22:37, 22:39, 22:41, 23:37, 23:39, 23:42, 23:44, 24:2, 24:6, 24:9, 24:11, 24:17, 24:19, 24:27, 24:33, 24:40, 24:42, 24:46, 25:1, 25:4, 25:6, 25:8, 25:10, 27:4, 27:6, 27:18, 27:21, 27:24, 27:26, 27:45, 27:47, 29:4, 29:7, 29:41, 29:43, 29:45, 29:47, 30:15, 30:17, 30:34, 30:36, 30:38, $30: 41,30: 43,30: 45$, 30:47, 31:2, 31:4, 31:9, 31:11, 31:13, 31:18, 31:21, 31:23, 31:25, 31:27, 31:29, 31:32, 31:34, 31:37, 31:39, 31:42, 32:6, 32:10, 32:12, 32:15, 32:20, 32:22, 32:24, 32:26, 32:28, 32:31, 32:33, 32:36, 32:38, 32:40,

33:13, 33:18, 34:19, 34:24, 34:26, 34:28, 34:31, 34:33, 34:40, 34:42, 35:13, 35:15 36:9, 36:11, 36:13, 36:16, 37:47, 38:2, 39:9, 39:11, 39:13, 39:17, 39:19, 39:21, 39:23, 39:26, 39:28, 39:34 39:39, 39:41, 39:45, 40:1, 40:3, 40:7, 40:9, 42:7, 42:9, 42:11, 42:14, 42:16, 42:21, 42:24, 42:26, 42:29, 42:31, 42:45, 43:2, 43:6, 43:12, 43:15, 43:17, 43:19, 43:26, 43:31, 43:34 43:40, 43:43, 43:45 44:1, 44:5, 44:10, 44:12, 44:14, 44:18, 44:20, 44:22, 44:34, 44:36, 44:39, 44:42, 44:45, 45:1, 45:3, 45:5, 45:8, 45:10, 45:13, 45:15, 45:18, 45:20, 45:22, 45:31, 45:36, 45:38, 45:43, 46:1, 46:7, 46:13, 46:15, 46:19, 46:21, 46:25, 46:27, 46:34, 46:40, 47:3, 47:5, 47:7, 47:9, 47:11, 47:14, 47:19, 47:21, 47:23, 47:26, 47:36, 47:41, 47:43, 47:46, 48:2, 48:5,
48:8, 48:10, 48:13, 48:20, 48:24, 48:26, 48:28, 48:30, 48:32, 48:36, 48:38, 48:41, 48:43, 48:47, 49:4, 49:12, 49:22, 49:27, 49:29, 49:32, 49:34, 49:36, 49:38, 49:41, 49:43, 49:46, 50:5, 50:7, 50:9, 50:12, 50:14, 50:17, 50:28, 50:31, 50:38, 51:6, 51:8, 51:12, 51:14, 51:16, 51:18, 51:21, 51:23, 51:26, 51:31, 51:34, 51:44, 52:10, 52:12, 52:17, 52:19, 52:22, 52:24, 52:26, 52:29, 52:31, 52:34, 52:36, 52:44, 52:46, 53:3, 53:11, 53:15, 53:17, 53:19, 53:22, 53:24
mucking [1] - 26:21 [1] - 12:12 mushrooming [2] - 11:37, 21:28
must [1] - 35:41
MX6 [2] - 33:7, 33:28

| $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- |
|  |
| naked $[1]-37: 22$ |
| name $[9]-2: 17,2: 32$, |

3:17, 5:38, 8:21, 9:2, 19:17, 19:22, 30:15
names [1] - 2:16
Natural [6] - 1:26, 1:36,
1:40, 2:2, 2:19, 2:33
Neal [2] - 9:6, 24:21
Nealo [12]-25:2, 25:30,
26:4, 26:20, 26:41,
27:33, 28:10, 28:23,
28:35, 40:34, 43:27
near [2]-37:42, 37:43 necessarily [2]-15:44,
25:10
neck [1] - 36:41
need [8] - 5:33, 9:28, 13:8,
13:18, 13:19, 27:36, 37:30, 48:33
needed [6] - 25:40, 25:43, 26:16, 26:31, 29:30,
40:27
negotiations [1]-7:39
Nelson [2]-1:27, 2:4
never [6] - 29:21, 32:18, 32:38, 32:40, 33:9, 50:23
New [1] - 7:26
new [2] - 29:30, 49:6
Newlands [1] - 7:34
next [4]-21:14, 27:36,
36:35, 40:39
nibble [1] - 29:14
$\square[1]-12: 14$
night $[7]$ - 11:5, 11:9, 14:29, 14:30, 19:7, 47:27, 47:28
nights [2]-10:41, 47:27 nine [2] - 37:24, 41:45 no-one [3]-12:28, 40:26 noisier [1] - 24:29 none [2]-25:36, 37:6 normal [5] - 18:34, 20:31, 24:29, 31:30, 45:5
normally [3]-13:36, 31:39, 53:4
North [2]-7:37, 7:42 note [2]-11:15, 11:18 noted [4]-11:25, 11:27, 11:28, 42:45
notepad [1] - 14:41 nothing [20]-13:32, 13:40, 13:45, 18:44, 18:47, 21:22, 21:30, 24:19, 25:47, 26:1, 27:8, 27:9, 28:20, 28:38, 33:31, 40:37, 48:14, 48:17, 49:18, 53:1
notice [7]-4:22, 4:27, 4:32, 4:37, 4:42, 4:43, 6:37
Notice [1] - 1:15
noticed [3]-21:40, 24:34, 28:32
number [4]-8:29, 39:30, 42:46, 44:8

|  |
| :--- |
|  |
| o'clock [1] $-26: 42$ |
| O-ring [1] $-49: 17$ |
| O-rings [1] - 49:18 |
| O2 [1] - 34:12 |
| Oaky [4] - 7:37, 7:42, 7: |
| 8:22 |
| obviously [6] - 32:6, |
| $39: 28,42: 45,45: 38$, | 46:35, 48:16

occasion [1] - 4:19
occupation [1] - 5:43
occurred [4] - 3:32, 8:42,
9:42, 39:14
OF [2] - 1:9, 1:20
offence [2]-5:11, 5:27
offered [1] - 7:41
offgoing [1] - 11:5
office [2]-2:2, 9:7
officer [5] - 2:18, 2:22, 4:17, 5:28, 9:6
Officer [1] - 1:35
once [1] - 34:42
one [36] - 8:29, 10:14,
12:17, 12:28, 15:17, 15:21, 18:9, 22:27, 22:29, 23:45, 27:16, 31:11, 31:13, 31:15, 31:23, 32:15, 33:4, 33:42, 34:10, 34:20, 34:43, 35:23, 38:19,
39:34, 40:26, 42:35, 42:40, 44:2, 46:8, 46:28, 46:32, 48:6, 50:38, 52:13
ones [1] - 30:2
open [11]-13:11, 14:10,
15:25, 26:15, 27:35,
27:42, 28:44, 29:8,
40:20, 47:14, 50:3
opened [1] - 8:2
operating [2] - 31:7, 31:13
operational [1] - 31:15
operator [1] - 46:29
operators [6] - 10:13, 13:46, 19:26, 27:26, 51:27
opportunity [3]-4:13, 6:25, 8:38
orders [4]-13:47, 14:1, 14:2
ordinary [1] - 51:47
organise [2]-26:37
ourselves [3] - 9:8, 26:41, 26:42
outbye [11]-7:46, 8:30, 8:36, 16:9, 21:34, 21:35, 23:32, 24:4, 38:46, 50:47
overlap [1] - 11:6
override [2] - 47:3, 47:5
overtake [1] - 8:24
overview [2] - 7:22, 9:47
own [1] - 41:24
pack [5]-13:29, 13:30,
13:32, 13:43, 13:46
packs [1] - 13:37
page [5]-9:1, 9:28, 52:47,
53:4, 53:12
pages [1]-9:27
pain [1] - 38:21
pan [2]-50:21, 51:9
panel [4]-8:4, 8:13, 8:37, 40:40
panels [1] - 51:14
pants [2]-38:14, 38:15
parked [1] - 28:21
part [2]-39:29, 51:45
partaking [1] - 6:12
particular [1] - 5:18
parts [2]-17:22
passed [1] - 39:1
past $[7]$ - 24:7, 25:20,
28:29, 32:34, 34:5,
46:16, 46:44
Patrick [1] - 2:17
peek [1] - 34:16
penalty [1]-5:16
people [3]-36:29, 42:16, 43:28
per [5] - 34:12, 41:28, 45:33, 45:39, 46:37
perhaps [1] - 39:34
permitted [1] - 6:22
persevered [1] - 24:20
persevering [1] - 19:38 person [5] - 2:15, 3:25, 4:18, 12:17, 42:18
personal [1] - 42:11
persons [1]-2:6
perspective [1] - 48:32
persuading [1] - 26:27
[5] - 12:13, 19:34,
28:13, 30:3, 35:46
phone [15] - 15:19, 21:12,
23:21, 26:4, 26:20, 26:40, 27:16, 29:29,
30:28, 30:31, 30:32,
32:16, 40:9, 40:31
picked [2] - 38:30, 41:11
picks [2] - 51:23, 51:28
picture [1] - 35:45
piles [1] - 27:28
pillar [2]-8:13, 15:43
pit [4] - 9:7, 40:14, 40:16, 41:10
pitting [1] - 50:41
place [12]-6:26, 23:9,
26:16, 31:29, 36:33,
43:13, 43:22, 43:29,
43:34, 45:29, 52:19
plan [26] - 13:3, 13:33,
14:4, 14:6, 17:33, 17:39, 17:40, 20:5, 20:42,
22:23, 22:24, 23:9,
23:13, 25:35, 25:41,
26:35, 27:32, 28:18,
43:12, 43:15, 43:38,

46:40, 50:46
plans [1] - 43:29
plate [2] - 47:29, 47:32
point [1] - 32:13
poke [1]-21:26
poked [2]-21:40, 34:42
poll [1]-21:13
position [4]-2:16, 10:1, 12:24, 13:5
power [6] - 30:9, 34:10, 35:23, 40:14, 40:16, 48:6
prep [1] - 23:28
prepare [1] - 9:19
prepared [1] - 9:30
prepares [1] - 13:43
present [4]-1:43, 2:6,
2:16, 5:43
pressure [11] - 20:14,
24:7, 24:11, 24:14,
24:15, 24:17, 32:8,
32:16, 32:17, 33:44, 51:46
pressures [2] - 14:22, 30:29
pretty [14] - 15:32, 15:33,
16:34, 16:40, 17:23,
19:3, 19:6, 20:45, 22:46, 24:14, 33:14, 33:38, 36:5, 39:14
preventing [1] - 6:11
previous [2] - 11:8, 51:14
previously [1] - 12:18
Priest [3]-19:24, 20:22, 26:36
primed [1] - 44:26
Principal [1] - 1:35
principal [1]-2:18
print [1]-2:21
private [1]-6:23
proactive [1] - 43:28
probe [1] - 25:45
problem [1] - 47:28
problems [7]-19:4, 19:8, 23:31, 47:23, 49:8, 49:16, 49:17
procedure [2]-43:13, 43:15
proceeded [1] - 21:3
process [9]-8:24, 11:15,
13:11, 23:35, 45:26,
45:40, 45:41, 45:43,
46:37
produce [1] - 20:32
production [7]-5:45,
8:31, 9:18, 10:4, 10:13,
10:14, 14:30
program [2]-8:7, 8:9
project [1] - 7:44
propagating [1] - 22:17
properly [2]-2:38, 48:22
props [2]-26:30, 27:41
Propsetter [1] - 21:14
Propsetters [4]-25:35,
26:14, 26:31, 26:37
protocol [3] - 40:12,
40:35, 46:2
protruding [1] - 11:35
provide [7]-2:35, 4:20,
5:27, 7:22, 8:43, 9:47, 50:14
provided [3] - 5:13, 53:8, 53:9
provisions [3]-5:7, 6:42, 7:1
pull $[3]-13: 19,13: 20$, 14:44
pulled [8] - 15:3, 21:36,
21:37, 25:29, 27:11,
27:12, 27:32, 28:2
pulling [7]-13:9, 32:3,
41:18, 46:22, 46:32,
47:32
pulsating [1] - 23:44
pump [4]-13:5, 13:8, 20:7
pumped [2] - 19:5, 20:12
pumping [3] - 20:6, 20:39, 26:30
pumps [1] - 28:3
PUR [1] - 51:39
purpose [6]-2:20, 4:7,
4:41, 8:47, 9:23, 9:41
purposes [1]-2:14
pursuant [1] - 5:10
pursued [2]-25:1, 25:20
push [2] - 39:15, 44:6
pushed [9]-26:29, 28:26,
37:18, 38:15, 38:22,
38:34, 40:23
pushing [2]-38:42, 44:14
put [17]-5:5, 14:21, 26:7,
26:23, 27:34, 28:2,
42:18, 42:47, 43:28,
43:34, 43:37, 44:1,
45:28, 45:29, 49:34, 50:25
Put [2] - 38:36, 41:23
putting [1]-28:6

| $\mathbf{Q}$ |
| :---: |

QLD [1] - 1:27
quarter [2]-10:36, 28:28
Queensland [1] - 7:32
QUEENSLAND [1] - 1:9
questions [22]-3:35,
4:19, 4:20, 5:5, 6:24, 7:7, 7:21, 9:40, 11:42, 13:16, 13:29, 14:3,
39:11, 39:24, 39:31,
39:43, 39:46, 40:35,
45:15, 48:39, 49:22,
51:31
quick [1] - 34:12
quicker [5] - 20:1, 28:1,
28:6, 36:47
quickly [1] - 47:19
quite [3]-33:29, 43:21, 50:17

| R |
| ---: |
| race $[1]-50: 2$ |

ran [6]-31:44, 37:3, 37:26, 37:44, 45:5
rang) [1] - 15:19
range [1] - 48:47
ranged [1] - 23:39
rate [1]-31:47
rather [2] - 4:9, 44:7
reacted [1] - 36:31
read [1]-11:14
reading ${ }_{[2]}-13: 1,14: 15$
readings [4]-14:23,
14:41, 23:16, 40:36
ready [10] - 25:35, 25:42,
26:14, 26:15, 26:28,
26:31, 27:45, 27:47,
28:3, 28:8
real [5] - 18:44, 21:12,
41:40, 42:3, 51:27
realised [2]-28:31, 37:39
really [8] - 15:16, 33:22,
34:34, 34:35, 37:6,
38:32, 49:18, 50:34
rear [11] - 17:2, 17:21,
20:29, 21:8, 21:9, 21:20,
21:41, 26:46, 44:15,
44:20
reason [2] - 33:30, 35:34
reasonable [2]-5:13, 5:14
reasons [1] - 44:26
reassess [2]-20:20,
29:38
reassurance [1] - 38:38
reassured [4]-36:41,
36:46, 37:17, 38:23
receive [1] - 13:31
received [4]-3:33, 4:22,
4:27, 4:43
recent [1] - 44:26
reckon [1] - 21:44
recommencing [1] - 3:1
recommendations [1] -
42:46
RECORD ${ }_{[1]}-1: 20$
record [3] - 2:1, 6:26, 52:20
recorded [1] - 3:41
recording [1] - 3:42
records [1] - 52:41
reducing [2] - 44:14
refer [2] - 9:39, 9:41
referred [2]-52:37, 52:41
refreshing [1] - 9:42
regarding [1] - 5:6
regards [6]-8:41, 11:12,
11:15, 47:23, 48:43,
51:4
regime [2]-10:5, 10:6
registering [1] - 33:33
relates [1]-5:19
relation [2]-3:31, 6:26
relative [1] - 16:21
relatively [2]-20:37, 24:3
relief [1] - 8:35
remainder [1]-7:16
remember [2]-34:13, 35:25
remind $[1]-7: 7$
replacing [1] - 47:33
report [4]-9:29, 45:22,
45:23, 45:24
reported [3] - 44:28,
45:40, 45:44
reports [10]-9:19, 9:24,
9:30, 11:8, 11:9, 11:14,
13:1, 45:25, 45:44,
45:46
representative [1] - 6:17
representing [1] - 3:23
require [2]-4:18, 5:5
requirement [6] - 5:6,
5:12, 5:15, 5:19, 5:21,
5:29
requirements [1]-5:34
requiring [1] - 4:22
reschedule [1]-7:16
rescuers [1] - 35:34
Resources [6]-1:26,
1:36, 1:40, 2:3, 2:19,
2:34
response [1]-44:5
responsibilities [1] - 10:1
rest [2]-27:16, 28:14
restarting [1] - 46:37
result [1]-5:4
retreated [2]-44:42, 44:45
return [2]-44:29, 49:39
reverse [2]-28:32, 33:27
reversed [3]-32:42,
32:46, 33:8
reversing [2] - 32:41,
33:15
rib [4]-15:42, 15:43,
21:30, 34:15
rich [3] - 5:34, 6:16, 52:19
RICH ${ }_{[19]}-2: 30,2: 38$,
3:15, 3:22, 5:2, 6:19,
6:29, 6:34, 6:39, 6:45,
7:4, 9:37, 39:34, 39:41,
42:16, 42:24, 42:29,
52:22, 52:44
Rich [4]-1:43, 2:7, 3:22,
4:29
righto [1] - 19:40
ring [6] - 26:22, 26:36, 29:34, 34:38, 40:3,
49:17
rings [1] - 49:18
risk [3]-41:30, 50:47,
51:2
road $[7]-14: 8,14: 9$,
14:12, 16:21, 16:22,
20:25, 52:3
roads [1] - 7:45
roadway [25]-11:36, 15:6,
15:9, 15:11, 15:19,
15:23, 15:25, 15:27,
16:10, 16:12, 16:30,
16:42, 20:10, 20:11,
21:41, 21:46, 22:16,
22:17, 22:19, 24:13,
34:7, 34:21, 34:29
roadway's [1] - 34:36
roadways [1] - 16:15

Rob [1] - 8:22
rock [6] - 24:35, 25:15,
25:20, 26:9, 26:30,
27:41
rocks [3]-23:33, 24:33, 27:27
role [8]-7:43, 8:12, 8:18,
9:18, 10:1, 10:15, 41:14
roles [3] - 8:3, 10:5, 10:13
roll [6]-17:27, 17:33,
17:35, 17:36, 24:43
rolled [1] - 17:41
rolling [2] - 24:36, 24:37
roof [8]-18:7, 19:3, 21:36,
26:8, 28:47, 32:1, 32:4
room [7]-3:2, 3:26, 12:41,
26:36, 40:15, 45:45,
46:29
roster [1] - 10:38
rotation [1] - 10:40
Rowan [1] - 19:17
rubble [1] - 24:33
rubbly [2]-23:42, 23:44
Rudolf [1] - 2:32
run [5] - 18:38, 41:2, 41:7,
47:16, 49:18
rung [1] - 26:34
running [17]-21:6, 27:7,
31:16, 35:24, 35:26,
35:27, 35:47, 36:2,
36:21, 36:22, 40:22,
46:38, 46:45, 47:43,
47:46, 48:2, 49:25
runs [1] - 46:45

## S

Safety [8]-1:13, 2:23,
4:18, 5:8, 5:11, 5:26, 6:43, 7:2
Sam [4]-19:24, 19:42, 20:22, 26:36
sand [1] - 23:39
sat [5] - 23:33, 24:20,
24:22, 38:10
satisfied [3]-6:36, 6:41, 6:47
scale [1] - 50:24
scare [1] - 37:9
scope [1] - 46:31
screaming [3] - 35:47, 37:40
screen [3] - 46:45, 46:47
seam [6] - 17:27, 17:41, 18:8, 18:18, 29:11
second [12]-9:28, 12:13,
12:14, 28:30, 28:31,
33:42, 34:10, 35:23,
35:32, 44:28, 46:30,
48:6
secondary [2]-7:28, 7:45
seconds [2] - 24:30, 33:40
section [4]-5:7, 5:10,
6:37, 53:6
sections [3]-5:25, 6:42,
7:1
$\mathbf{S}$
see [20]-14:33, 15:3, 15:10, 15:11, 15:18, 15:28, 15:30, 18:6, 18:17, 18:20, 21:27, 22:6, 33:41, 34:14, 34:45, 35:31, 37:43, 51:42, 53:13
seeing [1] - 52:2
seem [2] - 25:23, 34:26
selected [1] - 8:6
Sellars [2]-12:11, 14:3
send [1] - 28:12
sensor [8]-22:25, 22:31,
22:44, 26:1, 43:27,
45:38, 46:34, 50:36
sensors [4] - 14:25, 22:41, 23:3, 45:32
sent [4]-35:9, 41:30,
41:32, 42:39
serious [3]-3:31, 3:33, 5:19
Services [2] - 7:27, 7:33
set [3]-26:25, 26:43, 27:36
setting [1] - 26:24
seven [2] - 10:40, 33:43
shaft [11] - 14:34, 19:23,
19:31, 19:40, 21:2,
25:22, 25:28, 25:30,
27:14, 30:6, 30:24
shear [7] - 14:34, 19:23, 19:31, 19:40, 21:2, 27:14, 29:38
shearer [21]-8:6, 12:11, 12:13, 12:17, 14:4, 14:31, 14:39, 19:35, 26:3, 29:22, 29:24, 32:3, 45:32, 45:33, 45:39, 46:35, 47:38, 48:43, 51:23
Sherwood [4]-21:32, 31:34, 43:8
shield [2] - 31:39, 44:2
shields [2] - 15:18, 16:15
shift [17] - 10:14, 10:25,
10:27, 10:29, 10:44,
10:46, 11:2, 11:5, 11:9, 11:12, 12:3, 12:5, 14:29, 19:7, 47:28, 47:32, 47:34
shirt [3]-37:23, 38:12, 38:13
shirts [1] - 36:16
Shit [1] - 37:26
shit [1]-44:31
shitty [1] - 21:12
shock [4]-33:44, 36:25,
36:27, 36:32
shoes [1] - 38:37
SHORT [1] - 2:46
shoulders [1] - 36:41
show [2]-4:42, 9:24
showing [1] - 2:20
shows [1] - 50:46
shredded [1] - 36:16
shuts [3]-45:34, 45:39, 46:36
side [8] - 15:43, 16:9,
16:14, 21:30, 31:39,
35:39, 42:34, 52:6
sided [1] - 9:1
sides [1] - 4:43
sign [1] - 11:8
signature [1] - 9:28
similar [2]-33:38, 44:5
simply [1] - 52:40
single [3]-40:4, 40:19, 40:32
sit [3] - 16:22, 23:45,
36:23
sitting [2] - 16:42, 24:13
situated [1] - 2:3
situation [4]-42:1, 42:19,
42:33, 42:38
$\boldsymbol{s i x}[7]-8: 10,8: 26,8: 28$,
8:36, 10:13, 33:43, 53:4
six-page [1] - 53:4
skin [1] - 37:16
slapped [2]-28:36, 28:39
slapping [2] - 48:11, 48:18
Slater [2]-1:44, 3:22
Sloan [1] - 12:17
slot [2] - 14:28
slow [2]-23:35, 46:29
slowdowns [1] - 44:39
slowly [1] - 11:31
smack [1] - 37:12
smacking [1] - 37:11
small [1]-23:37
smash [1] - 26:10
smell [2] - 36:17

$$
[1]-12: 13
$$

snake [3]-28:22, 28:32, 28:45
snapped [2]-41:23
Solicitor [1]-1:43
solicitor [1]-3:22
someone [5]-4:11, 19:17,
36:4, 41:14, 42:34
sometimes [2] - 8:37, 16:1
soon [1] - 30:31
sorry [11]-10:9, 12:26,
13:36, 19:17, 19:22,
22:33, 30:17, 31:42,
40:7, 48:13, 53:3
Sorry [1] - 15:19
sort [23]-8:17, 8:23,
12:15, 14:5, 16:24,
19:29, 19:36, 20:22,
21:40, 23:32, 25:19,
25:20, 25:33, 28:15,
31:45, 34:4, 37:10,
38:34, 38:46, 40:34,
46:46, 48:47, 50:43
sound [1] - 35:7
sources [2]-48:34
South [1] - 7:26
Southern [1]-7:34
sparking [3] - 51:9, 51:24, 51:27
sparks [1] - 51:19
speaking [4] - 4:8, 4:11, 20:37, 24:3
specially [1] - 14:23
spent [10]-7:37, 7:43,
8:1, 8:2, 8:10, 8:13,
8:27, 14:5, 14:25, 23:30
sperm [1]-37:12
spices [1] - 51:40
spike [1] - 34:12
spiked [1] - 35:21
spoil [9] - 19:44, 19:47,
21:23, 21:33, 21:36,
22:15, 27:29, 32:2, 49:47
spoken [3]-20:4, 38:45,
42:2
spon [1]-51:38
sprayers [2] - 49:25, 49:38
sprays [1] - 49:39
sprocket [1] - 47:30
square [1] - 32:34
squared [1] - 31:34
stage [10] - 11:43, 24:21,
26:2, 26:21, 30:38,
34:47, 36:39, 38:27,
40:38, 40:43
stairs [1] - 33:39
stamped [2]-37:27
stand [1] - 12:20
stand-in [1] - 12:20
standard [6] - 15:33,
15:39, 16:34, 16:40,
43:9, 43:38
standby [3]-26:7, 26:23, 27:34
standing [13] - 11:37,
15:8, 15:10, 15:23,
16:15, 17:25, 20:36,
21:28, 21:42, 21:44,
28:9, 34:22, 35:30
standpipes [2]-27:43,
28:2
start [14]-11:1, 11:4,
26:24, 32:28, 33:2,
39:46, 40:39, 45:29,
46:40, 46:43, 46:47,
47:1, 47:16
start-up [2]-32:28, 46:40
started [10] - 7:26, 8:16,
8:26, 23:30, 30:1, 35:24,
35:26, 37:10, 38:26,
49:7
starting $[7]-2: 17,28: 46$,
29:1, 29:10, 40:43,
46:29, 46:32
stat $[7]-9: 19,9: 24,9: 30$,
11:8, 11:14, 14:15,
45:44
state [1]-2:16
statement [8]-6:26, 8:43,
9:1, 9:8, 9:10, 9:11,
9:13, 16:4
statements [2]-3:43, 53:7
stay $[4]-28: 13,37: 32$,
40:44, 40:45
stayed [1] - 21:2
steep [1] - 17:35
stench [1] - 36:17
step [3]-12:32, 12:36
Steve [2]-22:3, 51:32

Steven [4]-1:38, 2:7
2:32, 2:44
still [25] - 7:35, 15:8, 20:7,
20:40, 20:41, 25:12,
25:42, 27:40, 29:29,
34:2, 34:6, 34:8, 34:45,
35:20, 35:25, 35:30,
36:21, 36:40, 38:45,
41:27, 42:36, 47:43,
47:46, 52:3
stood [4]-15:10, 20:10, 22:4, 24:44
Stook [4]-1:38, 2:7, 2:32, 3:2
STOOK [94]-2:32, 2:41,
11:45, 15:3, 15:13,
15:21, 15:30, 15:35,
15:39, 16:4, 16:9, 16:17,
16:21, 16:27, 16:32,
16:37, 16:46, 17:6,
17:11, 17:15, 17:33,
17:45, 18:2, 18:6, 18:13,
18:17, 18:22, 18:28,
18:36, 18:42, 20:31,
20:36, 21:44, 22:1, 22:6,
22:10, 22:21, 23:37,
23:42, 24:2, 24:9, 24:17,
24:27, 24:40, 24:46,
25:4, 25:8, 27:4, 27:18,
27:24, 27:45, 29:4,
31:29, 31:34, 31:39,
32:20, 32:24, 32:28,
32:33, 32:38, 33:13,
34:19, 34:26, 34:31,
34:40, 39:45, 42:11,
43:2, 43:19, 43:45, 44:5,
44:12, 44:18, 44:22,
44:36, 44:42, 45:5,
45:10, 46:1, 46:13,
46:19, 46:25, 47:19,
48:2, 48:8, 48:20, 48:26,
48:32, 48:38, 48:43,
49:4, 50:38, 51:34,
52:10
Stook's [1] - 3:10
stop [3] - 39:6, 45:23, 46:40
stop/start [4] - 23:31, 23:32, 24:23
stoppages [2]-24:24, 44:40
stopped [5] - 25:31, 30:12, 30:21, 47:38, 47:44
straight [11] - 15:1, 24:35,
24:38, 24:44, 25:6,
26:10, 28:18, 32:42,
44:28, 50:36, 50:43
straightaway [4]-8:27,
30:19, 32:42, 45:23
strange [2]-17:11, 33:29
strata [1] - 10:7
strategy [1] - 46:46
stream [1] - 43:37
Street [2] - 1:27, 2:4
struggling [3]-9:9, 17:18,
46:3
stuff [6] - 23:44, 26:38,

49:9, 50:24, 50:41,
51:41
stuffed [2] - 23:46, 26:47
stuffing [2] - 26:3, 27:15
stumbling [1] - 37:40
substances [1] - 6:2
suck [1] - 46:4
sucking [1] - 46:10
sudden [1] - 35:40
sufficient [1]-6:31
suggests [1] - 42:12
suits [1] - 37:12
sums [1] - 46:42
Sunday [1] - 44:1
supervisor [1]-7:45
supervisor's [1] - 7:43
supplied [2]-4:1, 13:37
support [4]-7:28, 7:45,
11:37, 21:28
supports [1] - 49:5
suppose [1] - 49:7
surface [1] - 12:21
suspend [1] - 2:44
swing [3]-10:43, 10:44,
47:24
switching [1] - 23:22
system [8] - 39:36, 42:7,
42:41, 44:25, 45:10,
46:4, 47:7, 47:12
systems [3] - 41:1, 45:6

## T

table [1] - 3:44
$\boldsymbol{t a g}$ [18]-39:35, 40:28,
40:30, 40:39, 41:1, 41:2,
41:6, 41:15, 41:16,
41:24, 41:34, 41:41,
41:44, 42:32, 42:34,
42:35, 42:41
tag's [1] - 41:46
tags [4] - 41:18, 41:24,
42:16, 42:27
tailgate [50]-8:29, 11:31,
11:33, 13:10, 13:24,
14:23, 14:39, 15:9,
15:37, 15:44, 16:42,
19:44, 20:10, 20:19,
20:41, 21:3, 21:11,
21:26, 21:41, 22:31,
23:2, 23:3, 23:18, 24:6,
24:13, 25:38, 26:20,
27:11, 27:28, 28:26,
28:44, 29:29, 31:7, 34:8,
34:21, 34:24, 34:28,
34:37, 35:27, 39:1, 43:7,
44:29, 46:35, 46:41,
48:17, 49:43, 49:47
talks [5] - 13:31, 13:32,
13:39, 13:41, 16:4
tape [2] - 4:8, 34:46
tapped [1] - 28:35
tapping [1] - 32:3
targeted [1] - 18:23
Tarna [2] - 19:22
TARP [2] - 25:13, 49:14
T
-
temporary [1] - 7:36
tend [1]-5:15
tensioner [2] - 48:20,
48:22
terminate [2]-52:36, 53:24
terms [1] - 28:45
that'II [1] - 26:26
That'll [1] - 27:37
THE [1]-53:26
themselves [1] - 3:26
therefore [2]-5:4, 18:8
they've [5] - 15:10, 26:29, 46:41, 46:47, 53:5
thinking [2] - 33:10, 34:8
thinkings [1] - 34:34
third [1] - 41:9
thoughts [5]-20:6, 26:6, 37:22, 38:45, 40:5
three [14]-7:11, 8:34, 9:1,
11:23, 17:22, 19:23,
26:25, 26:28, 35:45,
36:42, 40:10, 41:38, 47:30
three-page [1] - 9:1
threw [3]-37:16, 37:17, 40:24
throughout [1]-6:21
throwing [3]-27:27,
27:28, 27:29
thrown [2]-37:22, 37:24
thump [1] - 32:40
tie [1] - 31:39
tight [13]-13:7, 13:17, 13:18, 15:17, 16:13,
16:14, 21:5, 21:6, 21:42,
28:27, 29:37, 48:11
tip [4]-13:7, 21:5, 24:35, 25:13
tipped [2] - 11:28, 12:46
tips [2]-13:9, 24:20
title [1] - 9:3
today [10]-3:23, 3:35, 3:43, 4:23, 4:36, 5:6, 6:2, 6:7, 7:8, 52:26
today's [1] - 4:2
together [1] - 37:19
tokens [1] - 41:46
Tolhurst [3]-1:34, 2:6, 2:18
TOLHURST ${ }_{[140]}-2: 1$, 2:14, 2:28, 2:43, 3:1, 3:10, 3:17, 3:25, 3:30, 3:40, 4:1, 4:7, 4:17, 4:27, 4:31, 4:36, 4:41, 4:47, 5:4, 5:25, 5:33, 5:38, 5:43, 6:1, 6:6, 6:11, 6:16, 6:21, 6:31, 6:36, 6:41, 6:47, 7:6, 7:21, 8:41, 8:47, 9:13, 9:17, 9:23, 9:34, 9:39, 9:47, 10:9, 10:17, 10:21, 10:25, 10:29, 10:34, 10:38, 10:43, 11:1, 11:12, 11:20, 11:42, 11:47, 12:5, 12:9, 12:24, 12:28, 12:32, 12:38,

13:36, 13:43, 16:44,
19:14, 19:19, 22:31,
22:35, 22:39, 29:41,
29:45, 30:15, 30:34,
30:38, 30:43, 30:47,
31:4, 31:11, 31:18,
31:23, 31:27, 32:6, 32:12, 35:13, 36:9, 36:13, 37:47, 39:9, 39:13, 39:19, 39:23, 39:28, 39:39, 40:1, 40:7, 42:7, 42:21, 42:26, 42:45, 43:6, 43:15, 43:31, 43:40, 45:1, 45:15, 45:20, 45:31, 45:38, 46:34, 47:3, 47:7, 47:11, 47:23, 47:36, 47:43, 48:10, 48:30, 49:22, 49:29, 49:34, 49:38, 49:43, 50:5, 50:9,
50:14, 50:28, 51:8,
51:14, 51:18, 51:23,
51:31, 52:12, 52:19,
52:26, 52:31, 52:36,
53:3, 53:15, 53:19,
53:24
Tommy [3] - 12:20, 27:22, 30:12
tones [1]-23:23
tonstein [1] - 18:6
took [5] - 8:18, 14:15,
14:40, 25:39, 41:29
toolbox [4]-13:30, 13:31,
13:39, 13:41
top [13]-13:24, 17:40,
19:47, 28:10, 28:15,
29:10, 30:28, 32:7,
32:44, 32:45, 33:9,
33:19, 49:24
tore [1]-41:13
totally [1] - 23:8
tour [1] - 18:32
track [2] - 26:28, 41:41
tradies [3] - 10:12, 13:47, 14:2
trainee [1] - 33:35
transcript [1] - 4:2
transition [1] - 17:35
trauma [3]-35:16, 35:17, 37:30
travel ${ }_{[1]}-20: 25$
treat [1] - 37:34
tried [1] - 32:7
tripping $[2]-38: 27,38: 28$
trouble [1] - 38:20
true [2]-41:22, 42:24
truth [1] - 52:27
try [4] - 20:18, 23:25, 46:4, 51:39
trying [8] - 19:39, 34:16,
35:32, 39:29, 44:6,
50:38, 51:1, 51:34
Tuesday [1] - 47:31
[3] - 12:14, 27:42,
35:46
turn [2]-28:22, 44:27
turn-around [1] - 28:22
turned [1] - 37:26
twists [1] - 33:10
two [31] - 3:5, 7:31, 7:34,
$7: 44,8: 1,8: 33,8: 34$,
8:39, 9:27, 10:12, 10:23,
11:23, 12:45, 25:21,
26:25, 31:14, 32:20,
33:37, 34:45, 35:15,
35:18, 41:8, 41:16,
41:31, 42:26, 42:36,
47:27, 53:5
two-minute [1] - 3:5
type [2] - 36:45, 50:24

| $\mathbf{U}$ |
| :---: |
| unaccounted [1] - 41:27 |

uncommon [1] - 21:30
uncommon [1] - 21:30
under [20]-2:23, 4:17,
5:7, 5:13, 5:20, 5:25,
8:17, 8:35, 11:10, 20:5,
24:3, 24:21, 26:6, 43:43, 45:24, 45:46, 46:2, 46:7,
53:6
under-manager [11] -
8:17, 8:35, 11:10, 20:5,
24:21, 26:6, 43:43,
45:24, 46:2, 46:7
under-managers' [1] 45:46
Underdown [2]-12:22, 27:22
Underground [2]-7:27, 7:33
underground [3]-12:33,
12:40, 46:9
underneath [2]-25:24, 41:46
undertaken [1]-12:34
unfortunate [1] - 29:22
union [1] - 7:39
unique [2]-32:34, 44:36
unless [2] - 5:12, 41:7
unrecognisable [1] - 37:4
unstitch [1] - 29:1
unusual $[3]-25: 4,28: 38$, 51:4
unzip [1] - 28:46
up [114]-7:32, 7:43, 8:4, 8:16, 9:9, 11:23, 11:24, 11:35, 12:34, 13:9,
13:11, 13:12, 13:19,
13:20, 14:20, 14:21,
15:17, 15:18, 15:46,
16:2, 16:5, 16:13, 17:25,
18:7, 18:34, 18:39,
18:40, 18:45, 19:45,
20:6, 20:20, 21:7, 21:18,
21:22, 21:34, 21:36,
22:4, 22:24, 22:25, 23:9,
24:44, 25:20, 25:24,
25:25, 25:32, 25:34,
25:38, 26:8, 26:22,
26:24, 26:25, 26:34,
26:43, 27:6, 27:36, 28:2,
28:6, 28:12, 28:21,
28:27, 28:28, 29:10,

29:16, 29:36, 29:39,
30:10, 30:23, 30:27,
30:32, 30:38, 31:18,
32:7, 32:16, 32:28, 34:1,
34:14, 34:15, 34:22,
35:10, 35:30, 35:39,
$36: 44,37: 3,37: 19$,
38:11, 38:19, 38:30,
38:47, 39:11, 39:13,
40:15, 41:11, 42:21,
42:43, 43:45, 46:10,
46:32, 46:35, 46:38,
46:40, 46:41, 46:43,
46:47, 47:14, 47:16,
47:37, 48:44, 49:20,
50:3, 52:12
upcast [1] - 45:6
upstairs [14]-12:42, 13:4,
20:5, 25:40, 26:14,
26:18, 26:22, 27:34,
29:34, 29:35, 38:45,
40:3, 40:31, 41:35
usual [3]-18:29, 18:31, 21:4

| $\mathbf{V}$ |
| :---: |

valve [1] - 40:15
velocity [1] - 44:18
vent [1] - 14:15
ventilation [11]-20:11,
23:17, 32:41, 32:44,
33:16, 33:28, 35:41,
43:7, 43:21, 44:16
Venturi [7]-21:6, 21:7,
27:7, 31:7, 31:11, 31:19,
43:37
Venturis [5] - 13:26,
14:47, 23:17, 43:8,
43:32
verified [1] - 23:2
via [2]-4:29
video [1] - 9:10
view [1] - 48:14
violent [1] - 33:43
visibility [5] - 33:27,
33:41, 34:15, 34:44,
35:26
visual [1]-27:8
visualise [1] - 24:36
VO ${ }_{[2]}$ - 43:45, 44:1
voice [1] - 2:14

| W |
| :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { wait }[3]-30: 8,30: 23, \\ & 45: 28 \end{aligned}$ |

Wait [1] - 30:10
waiting [2]-8:24, 38:43
Wales [1] - 7:26
walk [4]-14:8, 14:9,
14:45, 15:1
walked [5] - 14:12, 14:14,
14:16, 19:6, $30: 5$
walkway [6]-17:2, 17:3,
17:21, 20:29, 44:15,

44:20
walkways [4]-21:8, 21:9,
21:21, 26:46
wall [6] - 8:38, 32:22,
32:24, 49:7, 50:44
warn [2] - 5:10, 5:25
watch [2]-2:9, 53:20
water [5] - 49:24, 49:34,
49:43, 50:1, 50:21
wave [3]-30:34, 30:36,
32:8
[9]-12:11, 14:3,
19:34, 28:13, 28:18,
28:36, 30:3, 36:39, 37:4
ways [1] - 42:43
wear [1] - 37:13
week [10]-8:22, 12:16,
12:18, 18:32, 21:33,
31:14, 31:15, 31:16,
41:47, 42:33
weeks [2]-7:11, 42:33
weight [8]-11:36, 11:40,
15:15, 20:14, 20:41,
21:29, 22:18, 24:12
wells [1] - 46:17
wet [1]-14:16
wheezing [1] - 38:21
whereby [1] - 3:33
Whoever's [1] - 28:13
whole [5] - 30:11, 34:36,
42:41, 44:25, 47:34
width [2] - 15:25, 15:27
[1] - 12:14
Wilson [1] - 19:22
wise [1] - 24:2
wish $[5]-4: 10,4: 12,7: 13$,
39:19, 52:19
witness [1]-53:7
witnessed [1] - 7:10
wonder [1] - 39:41
wondering [1] - 52:47
workers [2] - 3:33, 53:8
works [3]-14:47, 42:42, 46:37
worries [1] - 9:17
worth [1]-41:17
wrenching [1] - 41:7

| $\mathbf{Y}$ |
| :---: |
| years [11] $-7: 31,7: 44,8: 1$, |

8:2, 8:5, 8:26, 8:33,
8:34, 8:39, 10:23, 32:20
years' [1] - 7:25
yell [1] - 40:43
yelled [2]-35:4, 41:45
yelling [5] - 37:29, 37:40, 37:42, 38:5, 40:25
yield [1] - 23:46
yourself [3]-9:30, 24:42, 38:36
Youse [2] - 36:42
youse [1] - 36:43
zero [5] - 33:27, 33:41, 34:15, 34:45, 35:26 zone [3]-40:44, 50:47, 51:2

