



LEARNING FROM INCIDENTS

INVESTIGATION REPORT

GRASSTREE MINE

Metallurgical Coal

Incident Number: IN.206200

Classification: HPI

Incident Title: LW909 TG CH4 >2.5%

Incident Date: 28/07/2019

Report Date: 20/08/2019

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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED

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Print Date: 8/23/2019 8:33 AM

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At approximately 09:00hrs on 28th July 2019 the CH₄ concentration in the LW909 tailgate roadway, located outbye the longwall face, began increasing at a steady rate coincident with the falling barometric pressure. At approximately 11:00hrs the CH₄ concentration had reached 1.90% and LW coal production ceased and the TG CH₄ concentration continued to rise, reaching a maximum and started levelling off at 2.25% between 12:40 to 12:50hrs. At approximately 13:10hrs there was a sudden rise in the TG CH₄ concentration, reaching 2.5% at 13:15hrs.

At the time of the incident the shearer was parked at around 70 chock and shut down for high TG gas. All personnel were withdrawn back to the panel crib room.

The LW tailgate CH₄ concentration continued to rise and levelled off, reaching a maximum concentration of 2.98% at 14:48hrs.

Inspection of surface goaf drainage arrangements found the compressor used to operate the goaf drainage venturi installed on the 908MG 11ct Hammer Hole has failed due to a blown radiator hose.

The compressor was not able to be repaired and was replaced by a compressor from a less critical goaf drainage venturi.

The 908MG 11ct Hammer Hole venturi was returned to operation at approximately 15:00hrs on 28th July 2019 which coincided with a rapid reduction in LW tailgate CH₄ concentration below 2.5%.

2 INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS

Damian Cavanagh	David Holt	Danny Brouwer
Dennis Black	Shaun Stingle	

3 KEY WITNESSES

List of Key Witnesses	
Name	Designation
Shaun Stingle	LW ERZ controller
Ben Millar	MSO
Shane Bailey	Seamgas technical officer

4 METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS USED

An investigation has been conducted in accordance with the Anglo American investigation methodology known as the Learning from Incidents model, supported by various investigative and analytical tools.

The analysis tools used for this investigation are:

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Analysis Tool	Attached as Appendix if applicable - Yes/No
Time Series Events Chart	Yes – mandatory tool
Control Analysis	Yes / No
Behaviour Analysis	Yes / No
Change Analysis	Yes / No
Why Analysis	Yes / No

5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INCIDENT

Summary of Incident						
Incident Number	206200			Department	Longwall	
Area / location	Longwall tailgate			Contracting Company (if applicable)		
Summary of findings from Incident Investigation						
Incident Category e.g. Safety, Health, Env, Legal, Reputation, Community.	Agent EG – Fall of Ground	Actual ISR Rating	Potential ISR Rating	Date of Incident	Time of Incident	Number of hours worked
Legal and Regulatory	High gas	Minor	Minor	27/04/2019	13:15	2.75
Task being performed at time of incident	Gas delay – no production due to TG CH ₄ >1.9%				Planned or Unplanned task?	
					Unplanned	Planned
Summary of Incident	<p>No production was taking place in LW909 (CH₄ >1.9%) due to elevated tailgate CH₄ concentration; rising through day shift on the falling barometer.</p> <p>At 13:10 there was a sudden increase in tailgate CH₄ concentration, exceeding 2.5% at 13:15hrs.</p> <p>Investigate of surface goaf drainage arrangements found there was no goaf gas drainage from the MG908 11ct hammer hole due to a blown hydraulic oil hose on the diesel compressor.</p>					
Immediate actions taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ERZ controller removed CMWs from the face Investigate surface goaf drainage arrangements to increase total goaf gas extraction Seamgas technical officer attempted to locate a replacement hydraulic hose. No spare hose available. Relocated a compressor from a separate venturi stack to replace the U/S compressor on the 11ct hammer hole. 					

6 DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

At approximately 09:00hrs on 28th July 2019 the CH₄ concentration in the LW909 tailgate roadway, located outbye the longwall face, began increasing at a steady rate coincident with the falling barometric pressure. The goaf drainage plant and blower were operating at maximum capacity and additional venturi gas extractors were operating. A number of venturi unit were found to be sharing one compressor unit between two venturis.

At approximately 11:00hrs the CH₄ concentration had reached 1.90% and LW coal production ceased and the TG CH₄ concentration continued to rise, reaching a maximum and started levelling off at 2.25% between 12:40 to 12:50hrs. At approximately 13:10hrs there was a sudden rise in the TG CH₄ concentration, reaching 2.5% at 13:15hrs.

At the time of the incident the shearer was cutting back to the MG, all personnel where on the maingate side of the shearer. All personnel were withdrawn back to the panel crib room.

The LW tailgate CH₄ concentration continued to rise and levelled off, reaching a maximum concentration of 2.98% at 14:48hrs.

Inspection of surface goaf drainage arrangements found the compressor used to operate the goaf drainage venturi installed on the 908MG 11ct Hammer Hole has failed due to a blown radiator hose.

The compressor was not able to be repaired and was replaced by a compressor from a less critical goaf drainage venturi.

The 908MG 11ct Hammer Hole venturi was returned to operation at approximately 15:00hrs on 28th July 2019 which coincided with a rapid reduction in LW tailgate CH₄ concentration below 2.5%.

7 CRITICAL CONTROL FAILURE

(List any identified critical control failures that contributed to this event)

What / which critical controls failed? (List CT number)	NIL
Why did the critical control fail?'	N/A
How did the critical control fail?'	N/A
What additional or revised critical controls and/or monitoring activities need to be established/change to mitigate risk of recurrences, or to improve risk control?'	N/A

8 FINDINGS / CONCLUSIONS

It is believed that the gas exceedance occurred as a result of a loss of tailgate goaf gas extraction through the failure of the MG908 11ct hammer hole venturi gas extractor caused by a failed radiator hose on the diesel compressor that supplied compressed air to operate that venturi.

9 PREVENTATIVE ACTIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS

The following key actions were identified to prevent recurrence and have been assigned as detailed below in Enablon.

Task Description	Hierarchy of Control	Task Assignee	Due Date	Task ID
Source additional fixed plant capacity to minimize use of compressors (compressor failure affects a complete individual hole, whereas plant failure would affect a part of the total capacity, no complete failure of individual hole).	Engineering	D. Holt	30/9/19	TS.01092459
Investigate and implement real time citect monitoring of goaf drainage borehole flow and composition, if it is practical to do so with the current life of mine	Admin	D. Holt	30/9/19	TS.01092460
Holes identified as critical to the goaf drainage infrastructure to be set up to plant, not compressors (where gas composition and capacity permits).	Engineering	D. Holt	23/9/19	TS.01092461

10 TEST FOR EFFECTIVENESS

Post Implementation Action Plan

Test of effectiveness is to be done to ensure that the above actions to prevent recurrence have worked as intended. (Nominally scheduled 3,6 or 12 months after completion of preventative action plan)

Enablon Task No.	Action Description	Responsible Person	Due Date	Completed Date
TS.01092462	Confirm operation and effectiveness of real time citect monitoring of goaf drainage borehole flow and monitoring	D. Black	30/03/2020	

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11 INVESTIGATION REPORT SIGN -OFF

The Incident Investigation Team submits this report as a true reflection of the information gathered. To maximize the preventive potential of the investigation report, the findings, conclusions and learning's of the report should be distributed as appropriate.

<i>Department Manager</i>		
Name	Signature	Date
Tim McNulty	Confidential	23-08-2019
<i>SHE Manager</i>		
Name	Signature	Date
Tim Roddan	Confidential	23-08-2019
<i>General Manager</i>		
Name	Signature	Date
Damien Wynr	Confidential	27/8/19
<i>Head of Operations</i>		
Name	Signature	Date
<i>Additional EXCO member signoff – if applicable</i>		
Name	Signature	Date

12 EVIDENCE & ANALYSIS TOOL APPENDICE

Time Series Event Chart:

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Time Series Event Chart

1 - TM.00021595 28/07/19 10:30:00
Attend pre shift meeting

2 - TM.00021596 28/07/19 10:40:00
Travel

3 - TM.00021597 28/07/19 11:10:00
Minesafe / Prestarts

4 - TM.00021598 28/07/19 11:25:00
CH4 >1.9% cease mining

5 - TM.00022672 28/07/19 13:10:00
Compressor failed on MG908 11ct hammer hole venturi goaf gas extractor

6 - TM.00021599 28/07/19 13:15:00
TG roadway sensor reaching 2.5% Ch4


7 - TM.00021600 28/07/19 13:30:00
Withdrew personnel to cribroom and accounted for. Notified MSO / CRO

8 - TM.00022673 28/07/19 15:00:00
New compressor installed on MG908 11ct hammer hole and resumed goaf gas extraction

Control Analysis:

Control Analysis				
Unwanted Event: Tailgate gas exceeding 2.5% CH4 due to failure of MG908 11ct hammer hole venturi goaf gas extractor				
Absent or failed controls and support systems	How did they perform?	Why did they fail or were absent?	Outcome of failed or absent controls and support systems?	Site Critical Control. Yes or No?
Goaf drainage	Failure of compressor resulted in failure of venturi gas extractor	radiator hose failed	increase in TG CH4 level above 2.5%	No
Goaf drainage	insufficient goaf drainage capacity	increase in SGE above predicted level and system design capacity	high CH4 background level and production delays during period of falling barometric pressure	No

Citect Trend – TG CH4, Barometric Pressure and Shearer Position:




Citect Trend – TG CH4, Barometric Pressure and Shearer Position – time when TG CH4 exceeded 2.5%:

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Incident Report Form:

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Anglo Coal (Capcoal Management) Pty Ltd
Capcoal Underground Grassreef Operations

Initial Incident Report
FRM.GTM.054

To be completed by reporting person with assistance from Supervisor (Surface incidents) or ERZ Controller (UG incidents)

ALL Sections of this form are mandatory unless marked.


Incident Number: 206200

Title of Hazard / Incident:		>25% TG Roadway			
Date occurred:	28-07-19	Time:	1315 Hrs		
Date Reported:	28-07-19	Time:	1325 Hrs		
Classification: Safety <input type="checkbox"/> Material Losses / Damage / Business Interruption <input type="checkbox"/> Legal / Regulatory <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Environment <input type="checkbox"/> Social / Community <input type="checkbox"/> Impact on Reputation <input type="checkbox"/> Workplace Exposure <input type="checkbox"/> Health Illness <input type="checkbox"/>					
Department: Longwall <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Development <input type="checkbox"/> Outbye <input type="checkbox"/> Compliance <input type="checkbox"/> Tech Services <input type="checkbox"/> Seamgas <input type="checkbox"/> SHE <input type="checkbox"/> Human Resources <input type="checkbox"/> Commercial / Supply Chain <input type="checkbox"/> Maintenance / Engineering <input type="checkbox"/> Business Improvement <input type="checkbox"/> Other					
Reportable to external bodies?		Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Mines Dept		
Specific Location:		Refer to plan			
Reported by:	S. Stingle	ID # 17923	Contracting Name / Staff: GT		
Key Person Involved:		ID #	Contracting Name / Staff:		
Key Person Involved:		ID #	Contracting Name / Staff:		
Key Person Involved:		ID #	Contracting Name / Staff:		
Injured Person:		ID #	Contracting Name / Staff:		
Others Involved:		ID #	Contracting Name / Staff:		
Initial Investigation Team e.g. ERZC / Crew Supervisor / CMW:		S. Stingle, B. Miller			
Equipment Involved:		ERZC / Supervisor; include ID #	S. Stingle 17923		
Crew:	B	Process Area & Department	Longwall		
Shift Length:	12	Hours into Shift:	3		
		Consecutive days worked:	3		
Activity:	Coal Production	Drug and Alcohol	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No		
Incident Description: >25% in TG Roadway					
Immediate Direct Cause:		Mechanism:			
Other Causes		Environmental/Contamination			
Immediate Corrective Actions Taken: Withdrawn men in panel back to cribroom					
Refer to AAMC Risk Matrix to determine the appropriate Consequence Type (matrix on back page)					
Consequence Type: Safety Injury <input type="checkbox"/> Material Losses / Equipment Damage / Business Interruption <input type="checkbox"/> Legal / Regulatory <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Environment <input type="checkbox"/> Hazard (POTENTIAL Consequences required only) <input type="checkbox"/>					
Actual Consequence: Not Applicable for Hazards	Insignificant <input type="checkbox"/> <small>(lost time case, damage < 0.1% annual revenue etc)</small>	Minor <input type="checkbox"/> <small>(medical treatment, damage 0.01-0.1% annual revenue)</small>	Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> <small>(lost time injury, damage 0.1-1.0% annual revenue)</small>	High <input type="checkbox"/> <small>(permanent disability/fatality, Anglo NP)</small>	Major <input type="checkbox"/> <small>(serious permanent disabilities/fatality, Anglo NP)</small>
Potential Consequence:	Insignificant <input type="checkbox"/> <small>(lost time case, damage < 0.1% annual revenue etc)</small>	Minor <input type="checkbox"/> <small>(medical treatment, damage 0.01-0.1% annual revenue)</small>	Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> <small>(lost time injury, damage 0.1-1.0% annual revenue)</small>	High <input type="checkbox"/> <small>(permanent disability/fatality, Anglo NP)</small>	Major <input type="checkbox"/> <small>(serious permanent disabilities/fatality, Anglo NP)</small>

Print Date	Original Issue Date	Version number / Date of Issue	Page 1 of 4
21/1/2019 12:19 PM	3 JULY 2012	0 / 1 MAY 2016	

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 AngloAmerican	Anglo Coal (Capcoal Management) Pty Ltd Capcoal Underground Grasstree Operations	Initial Incident Report FRM.GTM.054
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Has the hazard, defect or incident been effectively controlled on shift?		YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>
If not, why not?			
Safety			
Parts Injured / Location:	Medical Treatment:	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>
	Hospitalised:	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>
Environmental			
Media Impacted:	Refer to guide	Environmental Impact:	Refer to guide
Hazard			
Hazard Agent:	Hazardous Substance (Gas)	Hazard Type:	Act <input type="checkbox"/> Condition <input type="checkbox"/>

Timeline:	
01/01/18 06:00	Example: Attended Start of Shift
2307-19 030400	Attended Pre Shift meeting
" " 040110	Traffic
110-1125	Minesafe / Reports
1125	CU > 1.9% Gas mining
1315 28-7-19	TEI Residuality Sensor Reached 2.5% CU
	Incident Occurred
1330 28-7-19	Withdrawal Permitted → CU down and accounted for
	notified MSOL CEO

Additional Actions to prevent recurrence: (ERZ Controller/ Supervisor to complete)

Initial Incident Report Checklist:

Contact relevant site personnel: Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Have statements been collected?: Completed <input type="checkbox"/> e.g. Key person involved, witnesses (submit with this form)
Collect any relevant SHE MS Documents: Completed <input type="checkbox"/>	Take photos of incident scene as required: Completed <input type="checkbox"/>

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	Task Description	By Whom	Action Due (date)	Enablon ID #
PEOPLE Tasks	<p>Is counselling of the CMW required (see text to be used in task)? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p> <p>CMW to be counselled in line with the Anglo Coal Consequence Model and Applicable Misconduct Policy. Evidence to be sent to site HR for file.</p>			
WORKPLACE Tasks	<p>AND IMPLEMENT.</p> <p>REVIEW ACCESS RIGHTS TO REMOTELY MONITOR GODWELL PERFORMANCE FOR VO, UMM, CAO AND MSO (READ ONLY)</p>		9/8/19	
	<p>AND IMPLEMENT.</p> <p>REVIEW COMPRESSOR AND GOD DRAINAGE CRITICAL SPARE LIST AND STOCK STORE.</p>		9/8/19	
	<p>SETUP 17cm HORIZONTAL HOLE TO EXTRACT</p>		9/8/19	
	<p>AND IMPLEMENT.</p>			
OPERATIONAL Tasks	<p>REVIEW TOTAL GOD EXHAUSTION CAPACITY</p>		9/8/19	
	<p>AND INCREASE TOTAL AVAILABILITY</p>			
	<p>IMPLEMENT ON DRAINING SYSTEM TO THE CONTROL ROOM WITH HOLE PERFORMANCE</p>		9/9/19	

Conclusion: It was identified during triggered response that the 17cm horizontal hole being used for GOD DRAINAGE OF LW909. - COMPRESSOR BLOWN DOWN BY HOLE WHICH ISOLATED ADS EXTRACTION ON A FALLING BAROMETER WHICH ELATED TO 909 GAS ADS LEVELS.

Incident Sign Off:

Person Reporting	Name: S. Shingle	Supervisor (For surface incident)	Name: P. KETTER
Signature: Confidential		Signature: Confidential	
Date: 28-07-19		Date: 28-07-19	

Verification Sign Off:

Undermanager/ MSO	Name: B. MURPHY	Signature: Confidential	Date: 29/7/19
Superintendent/ Manager	Name: D. CANNING	Signature: Confidential	Date: 30/7/2019
Entered into Enablon By:	Name:	Date:	Staff ID #

If reported to the DNRME, is a form 5A required? Yes No

If Yes, Raise relevant task for the completion of Form 5A

Is a 'Learning From Incident' Investigation Required? Yes No

If Yes, Raise relevant task for the completion of LFI report

LFI Task Enablon ID:	Completion Date of Task
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Map / diagram (if required):



Anglo American Pte Risk Matrix		Hazard Effect / Consequence <small>(When an event has more than one Loss Type, choose the Consequence with the highest rating)</small>				
Loss Type <small>(Personal Injury Type - this needs to be linked to the Activity)</small>		1 Insignificant	2 Minor	3 Moderate	4 High	5 Major
Personal Injury Type - this needs to be linked to the Activity		First aid only - requires no other health care	Medical treatment only - requires no other health care	Requires first aid treatment - requires no other health care	Requires first aid treatment - requires other health care	Requires first aid treatment - requires other health care
Property Damage		Minor environmental damage - less than 100000	Minor environmental damage - 100000 to 1000000	Minor environmental damage - 1000000 to 10000000	Major environmental damage - 10000000 to 100000000	Major environmental damage - 100000000 to 1000000000
Business Interruption - Income Damage & Other Consequential Losses		No impact to operations or loss of business operations	Small impact to operations - less than 1000000	Medium impact to operations - 1000000 to 10000000	Large impact to operations - 10000000 to 100000000	Major impact to operations - 100000000 to 1000000000
S&P - Safety & Reputation		Low risk - low impact	Low risk - low impact	Low risk - low impact	Low risk - low impact	Low risk - low impact
S&S - Safety & Social Sustainability		Low risk - low impact	Low risk - low impact	Low risk - low impact	Low risk - low impact	Low risk - low impact
LIKELIHOOD	Scenario <small>(Consider near-future as well as remote events)</small>	Risk Rating				
5 (Almost Certain)	The likelihood of the event occurring is high (e.g. 1 in 10 or more times per year)	11 (M)	16 (S)	20 (S)	25 (H)	30 (M)
4 (Likely)	The likelihood of the event occurring is moderate (e.g. 1 in 10 to 1 in 100 times per year)	7 (M)	12 (M)	17 (S)	22 (H)	27 (M)
3 (Possible)	The likelihood of the event occurring is low (e.g. 1 in 100 to 1 in 1000 times per year)	4 (L)	6 (M)	13 (S)	18 (H)	23 (M)
2 (Unlikely)	The likelihood of the event occurring is very low (e.g. 1 in 1000 to 1 in 10000 times per year)	2 (L)	3 (L)	5 (M)	14 (S)	19 (H)
1 (Rare)	The likelihood of the event occurring is extremely low (e.g. 1 in 10000 to 1 in 100000 times per year)	1 (L)	2 (L)	4 (M)	10 (M)	15 (S)
Risk Rating	Risk Level	Guidelines for Risk Rating				
3 to 5	High	Action required to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Consider the impact of the risk on the business.				
4 to 5	Medium	Action required to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Consider the impact of the risk on the business.				
3 to 4	Medium	Action required to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Consider the impact of the risk on the business.				
1 to 2	Low	Action required to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Consider the impact of the risk on the business.				

13 RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

Issue 6	:	Full review to align the investigation report to the Learning from Incidents process being rolled out at Met Coal in 2018.	08 June 2018, Chris Gately, Lynda Butler
Issue 5	:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sign off table updated to include "Additional EXCO" member signoff. • Section 7 – New – Critical Control Failure (for HPI's only) • References to Met Coal removed. 	15 September 2015, Allan Gordon
Issue 4	:	Reviewed Sign off table updated to include sign off from Head of Operations	22 April 2014, Allan Gordon
Issue 3	:	Reviewed for currency – reformatted	8 January 2014, Bruce Gavin
Issue 2	:	Reviewed to align with Enablon Incident Database	6 March 2013, Graeme Redding
Issue 1	:	New Template	15 December 2011, Bruce Gavin

